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ABSTRACT 
 
The post-crisis financial services regulatory overhaul, and, particularly, the creation 
of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) and the Banking Union 
mechanisms, has increased the complexity of the EU’s financial supervisory 
architecture. In this new system, financial supervision is carried out by a network of 
interconnected financial supervisors, with different mandates and subject to various 
accountability structures, operating at both the Member State and EU levels and 
bound by a regime of cooperation duties. An efficient cooperation among and 
within the various levels of this complex supervisory architecture is critical for the 
good functioning of the EU’s financial system. This paper identifies and analyses key 
supervisory cooperation challenges in the single market for financial services, and 
assesses whether the EU legal and regulatory frameworks effectively address them. 
The paper argues that, despite the advancement of EU financial services integration 
and supervisory convergence that the post-crisis regulatory overhaul has brought, 
there are important legal and regulatory obstacles to an efficient supervisory 
cooperation in the EU; these source, primarily, from the following: first, the lack of 
clarity and precision of the EU’s regime on supervisory cooperation duties; secondly, 
the limited applicability of the ESFS’s mediation mechanisms to supervisory 
cooperation disputes; and, thirdly, the tensions between transnational mandates of 
financial supervision and national accountability structures and mandates. The paper 
also examines the threats that Brexit and the EU’s political crisis pose to EU 
financial integration and supervisory cooperation. 
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Financial Supervision, Banking Union, Brexit 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the European Union (EU), supervisory responsibilities concerning financial 
markets, institutions and the financial system are fragmented among a number of 
competent supervisory authorities (CSAs) at both the Member State and EU levels.1 
Owing to the cross-border nature and implications of EU financial-sector activities,2 
                                                
* Senior Lecturer in International Finance Law, Sussex Law School, University of Sussex. 
1 For an overview of the EU financial regulatory and supervisory architecture as well as its main actors 
see: House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘The post-crisis EU financial regulatory framework: 
do the pieces fit?’, HL Paper 103 (2015); and, E. Wymeersch, K. Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (eds.), 
Financial Regulation and Supervision: a Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP 2012). There is no single 
definition of CSAs but, generally, this concept comprises ‘entities of a public nature with officially 
recognized authority to carry out regulation and supervision of the financial sector –financial 
institutions, markets, and products– in a given jurisdiction’ –P. Iglesias-Rodríguez, The Accountability 
of Financial Regulators: A European and International Perspective (Kluwer Law International 2014) 
5. 
2 Despite the negative effects of the global financial crisis on international financial flows, intra-EU 
capital flows are of major importance to the EU economy; for example, in the year 2015, intra-EU 
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when CSAs perform supervisory functions they often need to cooperate with and 
assist each other; for example, the home CSA of a financial entity may need 
information about the latter that can only be obtained through cooperation of a host 
CSA in a member state where such entity is providing financial services.3 
An efficient financial supervisory cooperation framework is essential for the good 
functioning of the single market for financial services and, more generally, for 
fostering financial integration in the EU.4 Without adequate supervisory cooperation, 
CSAs may be unable to properly exercise their supervisory and enforcement 
responsibilities, and to guarantee core targets of financial supervision, such as the 
soundness of the financial markets, the stability of the financial system and consumer 
protection.5 Also, suboptimal levels of cooperation between CSAs increase the risk of 
an inconsistent application of EU law across the Member States,6 and supervisory 
arbitrage.7 
Before the global financial crisis, the rules and procedures on supervisory 
cooperation in the EU were, primarily, Member State-based, and their scope was very 
narrow, excluding, for instance, macro-prudential oversight.8 Financial supervisory 
responsibilities were distributed among Member State CSAs with different structures, 
targets, mandates, and powers.9 The role of EU in the organization and coordination 
of supervisory cooperation was very limited.10 Although EU financial sector laws 
acknowledged certain supervisory cooperation duties,11 cooperation was essentially 
                                                                                                                                      
Foreign Direct Investment inflows amounted to EURO 365 billion –see Commission, Commission 
Staff Working Document on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments (SWD(2017) 94 
final) 14. 
3 For examples of procedures applicable to supervisory cooperation requests in the EU see e.g. 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/980 of 7 June 2017 laying down implementing 
technical standards with regard to standard forms, templates and procedures for cooperation in 
supervisory activities, for on-site verifications, and investigations and exchange of information 
between competent authorities in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, O.J. 2017, L 148/3. 
4 See e.g. Commission, Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005 - 2010) (COM (2005) 177) 10, 
and ECB, Financial Integration in Europe (2007) 39-43. 
5 See e.g. E.J. Pan, ‘Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial 
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks’ (2010) 11 ChiJIntlL 243, 246. 
6 See e.g. T. Tridimas, ‘EU Financial Regulation: From Harmonization to the Birth of EU Federal 
Financial Law’ in P. Birkinshaw and M. Varney (eds.), The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon 
(Kluwer Law International 2010) 120. 
7 C.P. Buttigieg, ‘Governance of Securities Regulation and Supervision: Quo Vadis Europa?’ (2015) 21 
ColumJEurL 411, 425. 
8 See e.g. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Reformed 
Financial Sector for Europe (COM(2014) 279 final) 4. 
9  E. Wymeersch, ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial 
Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors’ (2007) 8 European Business 
Organization Law Review 237. 
10 For example, the Lamfalussy Committees –which are explained in section 4.2 below– played a role 
in the promotion of supervisory cooperation and convergence in the EU; however, they had limited 
powers and authority –see E. Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU 
Financial Market Supervision’, in E. Wymeersch, K. Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (n 1) 118. 
11 See e.g. recital 39, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted 
to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, O.J. 2003, L 345/64; and Art. 56, Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, O.J. 2004, L 
145/1. 
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articulated on the basis of non-binding agreements, and CSAs from the Member 
States enjoyed ample margins of discretion in deciding whether or not to cooperate 
with each other in particular instances.12 This resulted in inconsistent approaches to 
supervisory cooperation across the EU.13 
The crisis exposed the failures of such a national-based system of financial 
supervision and supervisory cooperation.14 The financial services regulatory overhaul 
that followed, and, particularly, the creation of the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) and the Banking Union mechanisms did introduce major changes 
to the EU financial supervision architecture, including in matters pertaining to 
supervisory cooperation.15 In this new architecture, there has been a transfer of 
supervisory responsibilities to the EU level; for instance, EU institutions –such as the 
European Central Bank (ECB)– and bodies –such as the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs)– are entrusted with direct supervision of certain areas of the 
financial system,16 and they also play a key role in the development of rules on 
supervisory cooperation, 17  the creation of a common supervisory culture, 18  and 
mediation between CSAs.19 
However, at the same time, the reforms of the EU financial supervisory system 
have significantly increased the complexity of the supervisory patchwork, which is 
composed of a network of interconnected CSAs with different mandates and subject 
to various accountability structures, operating at both the member state and EU levels 
and bound by a system of cooperation duties. This raises the question of the role and 
limitations of EU law in dealing with such complexity and guaranteeing an efficient 
supervisory cooperation framework where CSAs are willing and able to cooperate 
with each other. This paper analyses the supervisory cooperation challenges brought 
about by the complex and multilevel nature of the post-crisis EU financial supervision 
architecture, and assesses whether these challenges can be and are effectively 
addressed by the EU legal and regulatory frameworks. In order to do so, the 
remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 offers a concept and taxonomy of supervisory cooperation that takes 
stock of the EU’s multilevel and transnational supervisory relationships; this is 
followed by an examination of the determinants of the incentives and ability of CSAs 
to cooperate, respectively (Section 3). Section 4 charts and assesses the evolution of 
the supervisory cooperation regime in the EU, from the early days of the single 
market for financial services until the present; this section explains the transformation 
of supervisory cooperation relationships resulting from the creation of the ESFS and 
                                                
12 See e.g. F. Allen, T. Beck, E. Carletti, P.R. Lane, D. Schoenmaker and W. Wagner, Cross-Border 
Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policies (Centre for 
Economic Policy Research 2011), 5; and, J. Zhou, ‘Institutional Setup for the Single Market and 
Economic and Monetary Union’ in C. Enoch, L. Everaert, T. Tressel and J. Zhou (eds.), From 
Fragmentation to Financial Integration in Europe (International Monetary Fund 2014), 46. 
13 See e.g. H. Jones, ‘UK bank lobby urges better watchdog cooperation’ Reuters 28 Sept. 2007. 
14 The Committee of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets (2001), 69, 75. 
15 These will be explained in section 4 below. 
16 For an analysis of the use and implications of such direct supervisory powers see e.g. E. Howell, 
‘The Evolution of ESMA and Direct Supervision: are there Implications for EU Supervisory 
Governance?’ (2017) 54 CML Rev 1027. 
17 See e.g. N. Moloney, ‘Supervision in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ in E. Wymeersch, K. Hopt 
and G. Ferrarini (n 1) 101-102. 
18 The ESAs play a key role in the promotion of supervisory convergence –for examples of actions in 
this area see e.g: ESMA, Supervisory Convergence Work Programme 2016 (ESMA/2016/203). 
19 The ESAs’ mediation powers will be addressed in section 6 below. 
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the Banking Union. Section 5 examines the limits of and exceptions to supervisory 
cooperation duties embraced by the EU constitutional and legal frameworks and 
evaluates whether the process of EU financial integration and the increasing 
harmonization of financial rules have narrowed the discretion of CSAs from the 
Member States to withhold cooperation from other fellow CSAs. Section 6 studies the 
main mechanisms offered by the post-crisis EU financial supervision architecture to 
address cooperation disputes between CSAs, their scope, applicability and potential 
impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate. Section 7 considers the nature of the 
mandates of CSAs within the ESFS and the Banking Union and analyzes the potential 
tensions arising from the coexistence of transnational (EU-wide) and national 
(Member State) mandates of supervisory cooperation and of accountability 
relationships. Section 8 offers some insights as regards the threats to EU financial 
integration and supervisory cooperation posed by Brexit and the prospect of a multi-
speed EU. Section 9 summarizes the main findings of this paper and concludes. 
 
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: A WORKING DEFINITION AND TAXONOMY 
 
Cooperation is a relationship in which one or more parties collaborate and/or assist 
each other in the performance of certain tasks.20 In the field of financial supervision, 
cooperation refers, primarily, to the assistance provided among CSAs of the same or 
different jurisdictions, with respect to supervisory matters, namely licensing and 
authorization of financial entities, supervision stricto sensu, sanctioning, and crisis 
management.21  
The existence of and need for supervisory cooperation stems from two main 
factors. First, supervisory responsibilities are fragmented among CSAs along inter 
alia functional,22 sectoral23 and jurisdictional dimensions.24 Second, the nature and 
implications of the activities of supervised financial entities often cut across one or 
more supervisory dimensions; as a result, those activities may be subject to oversight 
                                                
20 The Cambridge Dictionary defines cooperation as: “the act of working together with someone or 
doing what they ask you”. 
21 R. Lastra, ‘Financial Institutions and Accountability Mechanisms’ in Iglesias-Rodríguez (ed.), 
Building Responsive and Responsible Financial Regulators in the Aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis (Intersentia 2015) 34. CSAs perform both regulatory and supervisory roles and, although 
cooperation may refer to any of these functions, this paper focuses on the supervisory dimension of 
cooperation. 
22 For instance, in jurisdictions that follow the twin-peaks model of financial supervision, also known 
as supervision by objectives, different CSAs are in charge of different objectives of financial 
supervision; this normally results in a CSA being responsible for prudential supervision and another 
CSA carrying out conduct of business supervision, of all sectors and entities in a given jurisdiction; on 
the twin-peaks model of financial supervision see: E. Wymeersch (n 9) 258; and, Group of Thirty, The 
Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace (2008) 13-14. 
23 In the three-pillar/institutional model, the supervision –both prudential and conduct of business– of 
banking, insurance and securities entities is carried out by different CSAs. In this model, which is, for 
example, used in Spain, it is the activity and legal status of an entity that determines the CSA that will 
supervise it; on the three-pillar model see: E. Wymeersch (n 9) 250-251; and, Group of Thirty (n 22) 
24. 
24 An example of a multilevel jurisdictional financial supervision architecture is the ESFS in the EU, 
where supervisory tasks are shared among EU bodies –e.g. the ESAs– and CSAs from the Member 
States; on the ESFS see, generally, E. Wymeersch, ‘The Institutional Reforms of the European 
Financial Supervisory System, an Interim Report’, Ghent University Financial Law Institute Working 
Paper No. 2010-01 (2010). 
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by various CSAs;25 it follows that, when CSAs carry out supervisory functions, they 
may often need to cooperate with each other. A supervisory cooperation procedure 
involves two key actors, namely a requesting CSA and a requested CSA.26 A 
requesting CSA will trigger a supervisory cooperation procedure when it needs 
cooperation by a requested CSA; this will normally relate to instances where, in order 
to exercise its supervisory functions, a requesting CSA must access information that 
can only be obtained through the intervention of a requested CSA.27 In this respect, a 
request may pursue, either the performance of actions by a requested CSA, aimed at 
acquiring and/or transmitting the relevant information, or the granting of an 
authorization to a requesting CSA to directly perform those actions –on its own, or 
jointly with the requested CSA; for example, a requesting CSA may make a request 
targeted at either gaining access to the offices of a financial entity in the jurisdiction 
of the requested CSA, with the purpose of conducting a joint on-site inspection with 
the requested CSA, or, alternatively, it may request that a requested CSA carries out 
such an inspection on its behalf.28 Whereas supervisory cooperation often involves an 
ex-ante ad hoc request of assistance by a CSA, it may also be provided spontaneously 
by another CSA; supervisory cooperation agreements do, indeed, tend to embrace and 
encourage unsolicited assistance among CSAs.29 
National cooperation takes place between CSAs from the same jurisdiction; in the 
United Kingdom (UK), two CSAs, namely the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) –in charge of authorization and prudential supervision of financial firms– and 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)–entrusted with conduct of business 
supervision of financial firms–30 have signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) that sets out mechanisms of cooperation, for example, through the exchange of 
information between both CSAs. 31  Likewise, CSAs engage in forms of 
multijurisdictional cooperation at the international level. International cooperation is 
particularly relevant in relation to the supervision of entities operating on a cross-
border basis –for example, incorporated in a Member State but with branches and/or 
                                                
25 For example, ABN AMRO Bank N.V, a large Dutch banking institution, is supervised by two Dutch 
CSAs, i.e. the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) –the prudential supervisor– and the 
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten) –the conduct of 
business supervisor–, as well as by one EU level CSA, namely the ECB; on the supervision of ABN 
AMRO see: ABN AMRO, Structure and regulators (2017) available at 
https://www.abnamro.com/en/about-abnamro/our-company/corporate-governance/structure-and-
regulators/index.html. 
26 This is the terminology used by, inter alia, the ESMA Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
on Cooperation Arrangements and Exchange of Information (ESMA MMoU), and the IOSCO 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information (IOSCO MMoU). 
27 For instance, a requested CSA may hold records of transactions executed in its jurisdiction by a 
financial entity that is being investigated by the requesting CSA. 
28 See e.g. Art. 6 ESMA MMoU. 
29 For example, Art. 13 of the IOSCO MMoU, stipulates that: “Each Authority will make all reasonable 
efforts to provide, without prior request, the other Authorities with any information that it considers is 
likely to be of assistance to those other Authorities in securing compliance with Laws and Regulations 
applicable in their jurisdiction”. 
30 For a critical analysis of the creation and rationale of the PRA and the FCA see E. Ferran, ‘The 
Break-up of the Financial Services Authority’ (2011) 31 OJLS 455. 
31 PRA and FCA, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (2013). 
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subsidiaries in other Member States or outside the EU.32 In the EU, there is a 
coexistence of forms of national cooperation, i.e. between the CSAs of each Member 
State, or between EU level CSAs,33 and of supranational cooperation, i.e. between the 
EU CSAs and the Member State CSAs. 
Without adequate cooperation arrangements and procedures in place, CSAs may 
be unable to properly monitor and discipline firms under their supervisory remit; this 
may, in turn, result in costs being borne by investors and consumers of financial 
services.34 As regards systemic considerations, the global financial crisis evidenced 
that lack of or insufficient cooperation in prevention as well as resolution stages may 
also hinder the stability of the financial system.35 An efficient supervisory cooperation 
framework is therefore essential for the accomplishment of key targets of financial 
supervision, such as the sound functioning of the financial markets, the protection of 
consumers of financial services and, ultimately, financial stability.36 In the EU, 
supervisory cooperation has been acknowledged as a condition of financial 
integration;37 consequently, as the process of construction of the EU single market for 
financial services advanced, policy makers have been devoting greater degrees of 
attention to how to enhance cooperation between CSAs within the EU.38 
Depending on the hierarchy of the CSAs involved in a given supervisory 
cooperation procedure, it is possible to define instances of horizontal or vertical 
cooperation. Horizontal cooperation refers to cooperation between CSAs from the 
same or different jurisdictions, operating at the same hierarchical level, or with 
different hierarchical standing, but with respect to matters in which they have equal 
authority or in relation to which supervisory authority is allocated symmetrically; an 
example of this type of cooperation would be that between a prudential CSA and a 
conduct of business CSA of the same jurisdiction in relation to the activities of a 
financial entity under the supervisory umbrella of both supervisors; in the 
Netherlands, the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) and De Nederlandsche Bank 
(DNB) –respectively entrusted with conduct of business supervision and prudential 
supervision of both financial institutions and pension providers– articulate their 
cooperation through agreements that embrace, inter alia, the exchange of information 
and supervisory dialogues between both CSAs.39 Vertical cooperation involves CSAs 
                                                
32 Efficient supervisory cooperation has, indeed, been identified as a critical factor for the smooth 
operation of the EU single passport for financial services; see e.g. Committee of European Securities 
Regulators, Protocol on the Supervision of Branches under MiFID (CESR/07-672b), p. 2. 
33 Such as the ESAs. 
34 The inadequate cooperation between the Financial Services Authority (FSA) –a former CSA in the 
UK– and the Bank of England with respect to Northern Rock –a banking institution–, contributed to 
the latter’s collapse; see e.g. House of Commons Treasury Committee, The run on the Rock. Fifth 
Report of Session 2007–08, Volume I (HC 56–I, 2008) 156-160; and, D. Schoenmaker, ‘Financial 
Supervision in the EU’ in G. Caprio (ed.), Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability: 
Political, Social, Cultural, and Economic Theories and Models (Elsevier 2012) 363. 
35 An example was the insufficient cooperation between CSAs from Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands with respect to Fortis’ liquidity crisis in the year 2008; see e.g. D. Schoenmaker, 
Governance of International Banking: The Financial Trilemma (OUP 2013). 
36 In this respect see e.g. IOSCO, Principles Regarding Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation: Final 
Report (2010) 7-9. 
37 See e.g. COM (2005) 177, (n 4) 10. 
38 For example, the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (the de 
Larosiére Report), published in the year 2009 as a response to the global financial crisis, proposed 
several measures aimed at improving supervisory cooperation in the EU; the de Larosiére Report will 
be further explained in section 4.3 below. 
39 See e.g. AFM and DNB, Covenant between Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten and De 
Nederlandsche Bank N.V. (2007). 
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from the same or different jurisdictions, operating at different hierarchical levels or 
with the same hierarchical standing but with respect to matters in which they have 
uneven authority; an example of such a vertical cooperation relationship would be a 
supranational CSA with exclusive competence on a given supervisory matter that 
requests information to a national CSA –bound by cooperation duties towards the 
supranational CSA– in relation to such matter; for instance, in the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) of the Banking Union, the ECB is entrusted with the direct 
prudential supervision of significant credit institutions in the Member States that 
participate in the SSM,40 and the CSAs from those Member States are bound by 
cooperation duties vis-à-vis the ECB in relation to the latter’s exercise of such a direct 
competence.41 
Cooperation may be requested and provided on the basis of informal or formal 
mechanisms. The former include forms of cooperation that do not abide by a 
particular set of pre-determined rules; an example is an informal conversation 
between the heads of two CSAs where they exchange views and/or information about 
a given financial entity or supervisory process. 42  Formal mechanisms comprise 
instruments of cooperation that follow pre-determined ad hoc rules –binding or 
otherwise– applicable to a supervisory cooperation relationship. Among the formal 
mechanisms, there is a distinction between binding and non-binding mechanisms. 
Whereas supervisory cooperation has traditionally been and still is articulated through 
non-binding instruments, such as MoUs,43 financial regulatory frameworks tend to 
acknowledge cooperation duties that require CSAs to assist each other.44 As will be 
shown throughout this paper, in the EU, the post-crisis overhaul has strengthened the 
binding dimension of supervisory cooperation through, among others, the expansion 
of supervisory cooperation duties to which CSAs are subject. 
 
 
III. THE DETERMINANTS OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION: THE INCENTIVES 
AND ABILITY OF CSAS TO COOPERATE 
 
Despite the key instrumental role of supervisory cooperation for the good functioning 
of financial markets and in advancing financial integration, CSAs is the EU have 
often failed to efficiently cooperate with each other. In the opinion of the High-Level 
Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, the pre-global financial crisis supervisory 
                                                
40 Art. 4.1 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
O.J. 2013, L 287/63 (SSM Regulation). 
41 Art. 6.2 SSM Regulation. On the issue of competence sharing between the ECB and CSAs in the 
SSM see, C. Gortsos, ‘Competence Sharing Between the ECB and the National Competent Supervisory 
Authorities Within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)’ (2015) 16 European Business 
Organization Law Review 401. 
42 Informal mechanisms of supervisory cooperation, such as exchanges of letters between CSAs, 
played an important role in the early stages of development of the EU single market for financial 
services; for an example of this see S. Bergsträsser, ‘Cooperation between Supervisors’ in G. Ferrarini 
(ed.), European Securities Markets: The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (Kluwer Law 
International 1998) 380. 
43 MoUs are written, non-binding, bilateral or multilateral agreements that set rules regarding exchange 
of information and cooperation between CSAs of the same or different jurisdictions.  
44 See, for example, Art. 2.3 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/77/EC, OJ 2010 No. L 331/84, O.J. 2010, L 331/84 (ESMA Regulation).  
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setting was characterized by a “Lack of frankness and cooperation between 
supervisors”45 that had detrimental effects on the quality and promptness of the 
responses to the financial meltdown: “As the crisis developed, in too many instances 
supervisors in Member States were not prepared to discuss with appropriate frankness 
and at an early stage the vulnerabilities of financial institutions which they supervised. 
Information flow among supervisors was far from being optimal, especially in the 
build-up phase of the crisis. This has led to an erosion of mutual confidence among 
supervisors.”46 
Suboptimal supervisory cooperation may adopt three main forms. The first is lack 
of cooperation; this may happen, for instance, when a CSA plainly rejects a request of 
cooperation. The second form of suboptimal cooperation consists of incomplete 
cooperation, an example being the provision of partial or insufficient information to a 
fellow CSA. Thirdly, there are instances of delayed cooperation.47 
Understanding the reasons why CSAs may engage in forms of suboptimal 
cooperation is essential to assess whether and how EU law adequately addresses this 
problem. Suboptimal levels of supervisory cooperation can be traced to two core 
general causes, namely lack of willingness and lack of ability of CSAs to cooperate. 
On the one side, a CSA –e.g. a requested CSA from a Member State– may lack 
willingness to cooperate, notably when the perceived costs of cooperating with 
another CSA –e.g. a requesting CSA from another Member State– are higher than the 
benefits. The provision of supervisory cooperation may, in the first place, result in 
costs for supervised entities, financial markets and the financial system in the 
jurisdiction of the CSA providing cooperation; for example, the delivery of 
information about a supervised entity by a requested CSA –e.g. a host supervisor– 
may lead to sanctions being imposed on such entity by the requesting CSA –e.g. the 
home supervisor. In a supervisory cooperation relationship the incentives of CSAs 
may be misaligned, notably, when the economic and systemic relevance of a 
supervised entity is different in the jurisdictions of the requested CSA and of the 
requesting CSA, and, consequently, the actions resulting from the provision of 
cooperation, such as the imposition of sanctions to the supervised entity, have an 
asymmetrical impact in those jurisdictions; for instance, in the early stages of the 
global financial crisis, CSAs from various Member States adopted protectionist 
supervisory approaches characterized by lack of cooperation in crisis management, as 
well as ring-fencing practices aimed at prioritizing the interests of their own financial 
institutions.48 Henceforth, the significance of a supervised entity in relation to which 
supervisory cooperation is sought, as well as the potential impact of the provision of 
such cooperation in the financial system under the supervisory remit of a requested 
                                                
45 De Larosiére Report (n 38) 41. 
46 De Larosiére Report (n 38) 41. 
47  With regard to supervision of banking institutions, K. D’Hulster –‘Cross Border Banking 
Supervision Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing between Home and Host 
Supervisors’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5871 (2011) 12– notes that: “At an 
institutional level, the home supervisor may not report, or may misreport or delay reporting supervisory 
information to the host supervisor, resulting in issues with regard to timeliness and relevance of 
information shared in a college.” 
48 N. Véron, ‘Banking Nationalism and the European Crisis’, transcript of prepared remarks for a 
keynote address “The Transformation of Europe’s Financial Landscape” at the 30th Anniversary 
Symposium of the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA), Istanbul, 
Turkey, 27 June 2013; and, D. Schoenmaker, ‘Banking supervision and resolution: the European 
dimension’ (2012) 6 Law and Financial Markets Review 52, 53. On the misalignment of incentives 
between home and host supervisors see, generally, K. Pistor, ‘Host’s Dilemma: Rethinking EU 
Banking Regulation in Light of the Global Crisis’, ECGI Finance Working Paper N° 286/2010 (2010). 
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CSA, are key factors that will determine the latter’s incentives to cooperate.49 In 
addition, supervisory cooperation is an intrinsically costly activity that requires the 
mobilization of time and other resources, whose cost will also be considered by a 
CSA when assessing the value of cooperation in a particular supervisory context.50 
However, lack of cooperation may also have negative effects for a CSA withholding 
it. Notably, it may hinder supervisory relationships with the CSA requesting or 
expecting cooperation. This may, in turn, result in future costs for an uncooperative 
CSA –for example if a CSA that has been denied cooperation behaves reciprocally 
and refuses to provide cooperation in the future. Likewise, a non-cooperative CSA 
may be subject to various forms of accountability when, by not cooperating, it is 
deemed as having acted against its duties and mandates.51 
On the other side, a CSA may face scenarios where it may be willing to cooperate 
but is not able to do so. There may be two primary reasons for this. The first is the 
presence of resource constrains that hinder the ability of a CSA to meaningfully 
cooperate, if at all.52 The second relates to legal and regulatory constrains that may 
preclude a CSA from offering cooperation. Legal and regulatory constraints may fall 
within three main categories. First, rules regarding supervisory cooperation may be 
absent or incomplete; this would include cases in which the rules concerning the 
procedure for supervisory cooperation are too vague and do not offer a precise answer 
on how cooperation is to be organized in a particular supervisory setting. Second, the 
legal framework in which a CSA operates may embrace exceptions to the duty to 
cooperate that allow and/or require a CSA to withhold cooperation in certain 
instances.53 Third, there may be cases in which there is a conflict between the 
mandate of a CSA and compliance of the latter with a given request of cooperation.54  
The EU regime of supervisory cooperation in the financial field has experienced 
major transformations throughout the various stages of development of the EU single 
market for financial services. The successive reforms of such a regime have aimed at, 
inter alia, fostering the incentives and ability of CSAs to cooperate as well as 
financial integration. The next section examines the evolution of the EU regime on 
supervisory cooperation from the early days to the present; it also addresses the 
reforms encompassed by the European System of Financial Supervision and the 
Banking Union, which have radically transformed the supervisory cooperation 
architecture in the EU. 
 
 
IV. EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN PERSPECTIVE: FROM 
THE EARLY BEGINNINGS TO THE POST-GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
REGULATORY OVERHAUL 
 
The evolution of the system of financial supervisory cooperation in the EU is linked 
to developments in EU financial regulation as well as in the institutional architecture 
                                                
49 K. D’Hulster (n 47), offers a detailed account of the impact of the economic and systemic 
significance of supervised banking entities on the incentives of home and host supervisors to cooperate. 
50 See e.g. R.J. Herring, ‘Conflicts between Home & Host Country Prudential Supervisors’ in D.D. 
Evanoff, G.G. Kaufman and J.R. LaBrosse (eds.), International Financial Instability: Global Banking 
and National Regulation (World Scientific 2007) 212. 
51 D’Hulster (n 47) 6, however notes that the accountability of CSAs for lack of cooperation with 
foreign counterparts is very limited. 
52 See e.g. R.J. Herring (n. 50) 212. 
53 This will be addressed in section 5 below. 
54 These potential conflicts will be examined in section 7 below. 
 10 
of EU financial services supervision. This section distinguishes three main periods of 
development of the EU regime of financial supervisory cooperation, and analyses the 
nature and instruments of supervisory cooperation in each of them. It also assesses 
whether and the extent to which different forms of cooperation address the challenges 
relating to the ability and willingness of CSAs from different Member States to assist 
each other. 
 
A. EU financial supervisory cooperation in the early days   
 
In the initial stages of construction of the EU single market for financial services, 
which can be traced to the Treaty of Rome and which received additional momentum 
in the year 1986 with the adoption of the Single European Act,55 cooperation was 
primarily horizontal. This was, to a great extent, due to the decentralized nature of the 
EU financial regulatory and supervisory architecture, which was largely built through 
directives and based on the principles of minimum harmonization56 and mutual 
recognition as well as a combination of home country control and host country 
supervision.57 In such framework, there was an exclusive delegation of regulatory and 
supervisory functions in the financial services field to CSAs of the Member States, 
with no EU level independent authorities performing or even coordinating those 
functions. 
Second, cooperation was essentially two-sided and based on separate bilateral 
agreements subscribed between CSAs of the different Member States. This system 
somehow filled the lack of EU level ad hoc formal instruments embracing and 
providing a common multilateral framework for assistance among CSAs. As a 
consequence, the system of cooperation was fragmented and asymmetrical, largely 
dependent on the specific –non-harmonized– content of bilateral agreements.58 
Third, cooperation was rather informal. This does not mean that it was voluntary. 
On the contrary, EU laws in the financial realm have, long since, recognized the 
binding character of cooperation among CSAs.59 However, those very same laws 
                                                
 55 The Treaty of Rome embraced the notions of free movement of capital and services as well as 
freedom of establishment; the Single European Act instituted a series of changes aimed at, among 
others, completing the internal market. For an overview of the process of creation of an internal market 
for financial services see: S.J. Key, ‘Financial Integration in the European Community’, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Paper No. 349 (1989); C. 
Bradley, ‘1992: The Case of Financial Services’ (1991) 12 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus 124; and, M.G. 
Warren III, ‘The European Union's Investment Services Directive’ (1994) 15 J. Int'l L. 181. 
56 Under the minimum harmonization approach, EU financial laws provided core common standards, 
giving, at the same time, room for some regulatory competition among the EU member states –see E. 
Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (CUP 2004) 54. 
57 See Commission, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the 
European Council (Milan, 28-29 June 1985) COM (85) 310 final, 27-28; and, T.C. Hoschka, Cross-
Border Entry in European Retail Financial Services (The MacMillan Press 1993) 42-43. Under this 
system, firms were authorized and subject to prudential regulation and supervision by CSAs in their 
home Member State, and entitled to offer services in other (host) Member States, which carried out 
ancillary regulation and supervision –see E.W. Warner, ‘"Mutual Recognition" and Crossborder 
Financial Services in the European Community’ (1992) 55 Law and Contemporary Problems 7, 8. 
58 For examples of these types of agreements see, for instance, the list of bilateral cooperation 
agreements between the Spanish securities supervisor (the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
(CNMV)) and other Member State CSAs, available at 
https://www.cnmv.es/portal/legislacion/MOUS.aspx. 
59 For example, Art. 10 of the Council Directive of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on 
insider dealing (89/592/EEC) (O.J. 1989, L 334/30) stipulated that: “The competent authorities in the 
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provided neither an institutional framework nor precise substantive and procedural 
rules on whose basis a system of mutual assistance among CSAs could be built. EU 
Member States opted for implementing a system of cooperation based on instruments 
that gave them substantial flexibility and discretion; two of such instruments were 
particularly salient: informal exchanges and memoranda of understanding (MoUs). 
Informal exchanges of information constitute the most basic and earliest form of 
cooperation among CSAs, and their use preceded the first directives in the field of 
financial services.60 In addition, this mechanism was pre-eminent and, to a large 
degree, exclusive, before cooperation was institutionalized at the EU level through ad 
hoc formal instruments. In practice, informal exchanges take place through meetings 
and conversations among heads or senior staff of CSAs. They may also adopt the 
form of goodwill sharing of documents. Informal exchanges are not bound by given 
procedural rules specifying whether and how information is to be disclosed and 
exchanged.61 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are formal but non-binding agreements 
aimed at providing a general framework for cooperation between the signatory CSAs. 
MoUs address aspects such as the scope of assistance and the procedures applicable to 
a request of cooperation, as well as the modes in which such cooperation is to be 
provided by the requested CSA or the uses that the requesting CSA can make of the 
information received. MoUs were the first instruments to set up common substantive 
and procedural norms of supervisory cooperation. In the early stages of the EU 
internal market for financial services MoUs were bilateral. 
In this period, financial firms and actors tended to operate, primarily, on a national 
basis and their cross-border activities were rather limited. This was, in part, due to the 
presence of barriers for cross-border financial activities and capital flows.62 Whereas 
the Single European Act and the resulting legislative measures in the financial sector, 
such as the Capital Liberalization Directive,63 the Second Banking Directive64 or the 
Investment Services Directive,65 all helped to remove some of the obstacles to cross-
border financial activities –notably, the introduction of a system of single passports 
enabled financial market actors to move across jurisdictions more easily–,66 several 
barriers to cross-border capital flows persisted in the EU.67 These did contribute to 
                                                                                                                                      
Member States shall cooperate with each other whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out 
their duties…” 
60 References to this early form of cooperation are provided by J.P. Lépine, ‘A Response to Fedders 
“Waiver by Conduct”’ (1984) 6 Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 319. 
61  They are, however, subject to compliance with the legal and regulatory frameworks in the 
jurisdictions of the CSAs involved. 
62 See J. Dermine, ‘European Banking Integration, Ten Years After’, Insead Working Paper No. 
95/92/FIN (1995) 7. 
63 Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, 
O.J. 1988, L 178/5. 
64  Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC, O.J. 1989, L 386/1. 
65 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field, O.J. 
1993, L 141/27. 
66 The single passport essentially meant that a financial entity authorized to operate in a Member State 
was allowed to offer its services in other Member States without being subject to additional 
authorization requirements in the latter. On the “Single Passport” see, Bank of England, “The EC 
single market in financial services” (1993) 3 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 92. 
67 In this respect see E. Grossman and P. Leblond, ‘Financial Regulation in Europe: From the Battle of 
the Systems to a Jacobinist EU’ in J. Richardson (ed.), Constructing a Policy-Making State?: Policy 
Dynamics in the EU (OUP 2012) 197. 
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creating neither cooperation incentives –due to the low interdependence between 
financial systems– nor a strong cooperation culture among CSAs. In addition, the 
very nature of the main instruments of cooperation also posed some barriers to 
effective cooperation; in this respect, both MoUs and informal exchanges of 
information were not binding and, hence, they did not impose formal obligations on 
CSAs. In addition, as will be explained in section 5, relevant EU legislation and 
MoUs executed between CSAs, incorporated a series of waivers from the duty to 
cooperate that enabled CSAs to withhold cooperation under certain conditions. Lastly, 
the lack of common substantive and procedural EU rules addressing cooperation 
arrangements led to a very fragmented system68 with high degrees of uncertainty as 
regards the rights and duties of CSAs in cooperation relationships. 
 
B. The Lamfalussy architecture: towards the Europeanization of financial supervisory 
cooperation 
 
In the late 1990s CSAs of the Member States adopted various institutional initiatives 
that led to a strengthening of the framework for supervisory cooperation in the EU. A 
major development in this respect was the creation, in the year 1997, of the Forum of 
European Securities Commissions (FESCO) by securities supervisors of the Member 
States, Norway and Iceland.69 Unlike insurance and banking supervisors, which had, 
long since, had their own EU supervisory cooperation fora, namely, the Conference of 
Supervisory Authorities of the Member States of the European Union and the Groupe 
de Contact, respectively,70 this was not the case in the securities field. FESCO filled 
this important gap by offering a space of debate and exchange of ideas among CSAs 
in charge of securities supervision.71 Another critical development was the creation 
and adoption of the first formal –albeit non binding– multilateral instruments of 
supervisory cooperation within the EU. Notably, in the year 1997, the Conference of 
Supervisory Authorities published the “Siena Protocol”72 and, two years later, FESCO 
adopted the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of 
Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities (FESCO MoU). 73  These 
instruments provided, for the first time, common rules applicable to supervisory 
                                                
68 Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan, 
COM(1999)232, 13-14. 
69 See S. Bergsträsser, ‘Regulatory Implications of an Exchange Merger’ in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, and 
E. Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro: Cross-Border Transactions, Listed 
Companies and Regulation (Kluwer Law International 2002) 294. 
70 The Conference of Insurance Supervisors was originally set up in the year 1958; it was composed of 
insurance CSAs from 15 EU Member States and three European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The 
Groupe de Contact was established in the year 1972 by banking CSAs from EEA countries –see K. 
Lanoo, ‘Supervising the European Financial System’ CEPS Policy Brief No. 21 (2002) 17, 19. 
71 Lanoo (n 70) 9. 
72 Protocol relating to the collaboration of the supervisory authorities of the Member States of the 
European Community in particular in the application of the Directives on life assurance and non-life 
insurance (DT/F/182/97). The Siena Protocol is a multilateral agreement of cooperation which 
addresses, inter alia, the responsibilities of home and host CSAs in supervisory processes –see N. 
Moss, ‘The International Network of Financial Authorities’ in D. Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of 
Central Banking and Financial Authorities in Europe: New Architectures in the Supervision of 
Financial Markets (Edward Elgar 2005) 388. 
73 The FESCO MoU was adopted on 26 January 1999 and its aim was: “to establish a general 
framework for cooperation and consultation between the Authorities referred to hereinafter, in order to 
facilitate the fulfilling of their supervisory responsibilities” –Art. 1 FESCO MoU. 
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exchanges in the EU; in doing so, they contributed, substantially, to the process of 
convergence in areas pertaining to supervisory cooperation.74 
The Member State-nature of the first EU-wide supervisory cooperation 
arrangements was, to a great extent, the result of the reluctance of the Commission to 
develop EU level supervisory structures and mechanisms. For instance, in its 
Communication: Financial Services: Building a framework for action, while 
highlighting the importance of encouraging a closer coordination between CSAs,75 the 
Commission argued that: “structured co-operation between national supervisory 
bodies –rather than the creation of new EU level arrangements– can be sufficient to 
ensure financial stability”.76 Whereas the Commission’s Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP), published in the year 1999,77 acknowledged the feasibility of future 
proposals for an EU single securities supervisor,78 it nevertheless advocated for the 
development of supervisory arrangements based on the existing multilateral Member 
State-driven structures,79 rather than the creation of EU level ones. The idea of 
institutionalizing supervisory cooperation arrangements within ad hoc EU level 
structures was first proposed by the Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on 
the Regulation of European Securities Markets (the Lamfalussy Report), published in 
the year 2001.80 In this respect, the Lamfalussy Report proposed the creation of an EU 
Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC), which would take over of the functions of 
FESCO but with an official EU status –as an advisory body to the Commission– and a 
broader mandate. 81  This recommendation materialized in the creation of the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) by the Commission in the year 
2001.82 This was followed by the establishment of its counterparts in the banking and 
insurance fields, namely the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(CEIOPS), respectively, in the year 2003. 83  The mandate of the Lamfalussy 
Committees was twofold. First, they were entrusted with the promotion of regulatory 
and supervisory consistency and convergence in the field of financial services in the 
EU;84 their tasks in this area included advising the Commission on policy issues as 
well as implementing measures, issuing non-binding guidelines, standards and 
recommendations targeted at furthering the uniform implementation and consistent 
application of EU financial laws by the Member States, and developing mechanisms 
                                                
74 E. Ferran (n 56) 47. 
75 Commission, Financial Services: Building a framework for action (1998) 5. 
76 Commission (n 75) 2. 
77 Commission (n 68). 
78 FSAP, 14. 
79 Such as the Groupe de Contact, the Conference of Insurance Supervisors and FESCO –FSAP, 14. 
80 The Committee of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets (2001). Such a report was preceded by an initial report by the same 
group: The Committee of Wise Men, Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation 
of European Securities Markets (2000) (Initial Lamfalussy Report). The Lamfalussy Group operated 
under a mandate from the ECOFIN –see Lamfalussy Report, 1, 70. 
81 Lamfalussy Report, 33-38. 
82 Commission Decision of 6 June 2001 establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(2001/527/EC), O.J. 2001, L 191/45. 
83 Commission Decision of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (2004/5/EC), O.J. 2004, L 3/28; and Commission Decision of 5 November 2003 
establishing the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(2004/6/EC), O.J. 2004, L 3/30. 
84 See, for example, Art. 4 of the Charter of the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR/06-289c, 2006) and Art. 2 of Commission Decision 2004/5/EC. 
 14 
aimed at fostering a consistent supervision and enforcement across the EU.85 Another 
core function of the Lamfalussy Committees was to enhance supervisory cooperation 
among CSAs;86 their work in this field was extensive and included the development 
of guidelines on supervisory cooperation,87 the creation of multilateral instruments of 
cooperation, such as MoUs,88 as well as the operation of mechanisms of mediation 
between CSAs;89 the latter gave the Lamfalussy Committees an important –albeit 
non-binding–90 mediation role in the solution of supervisory cooperation disputes 
between CSAs. The Lamfalussy Committees also took a close interest in and 
encouraged the work of colleges of supervisors91 –which CSAs had been establishing 
since the early 2000s–,92 for example by developing common principles applicable to 
supervision within supervisory colleges, including in matters pertaining to 
supervisory cooperation.93 
Whereas the supervisory architecture embraced by the Lamfalussy Committees did 
not entail a transfer of powers from the member state level to the EU level,94 it did 
however result in a greater centralization of (quasi) supervisory functions in the latter. 
Particularly, the Commission’s recast of the decisions setting the CESR, the CEBS 
and the CEIOPS in the year 2009, broadened their remit so as to “strengthen their 
contributions to supervisory cooperation and convergence”.95 Cooperation largely 
remained, nonetheless, a Member State matter, but with the EU taking a much more 
active and formal role in the coordination of assistance among CSAs. 
The FSAP proposed a series of legislative measures that –jointly with the 
introduction of the Euro– boosted the process of financial integration and cross-border 
                                                
85 Art. 2 of: Commission Decision 2001/527/EC, Commission Decision 2004/5/EC, and Commission 
Decision 2004/6/EC; and Art. 4 of: Charter of the CESR, Charter of the CESB, and Charter of the 
CEIOPS.  
86 See, for example, Art. 2 of: Commission Decision 2004/5/EC, and Commission Decision 2004/6/EC; 
and Art. 4.4 of: Charter of the CESR, and Charter of the CEBS. 
87  See, for example: CEBS, Guidelines for Co-operation between Consolidating 
Supervisors and Host Supervisors (2006). 
88  See, for example: CESR, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of 
Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities (CESR/05-335) (CESR MoU). 
89 See, for example: CEIOPS, Protocol on Mediation Mechanism between Insurance and Pensions 
Supervisors (CEIOPS-DOC-14/07). 
90 See, for example, Art. 5.3 Protocol of the CEBS Mediation Mechanism: “Mediation outcomes 
shall not have any legal effect, be legally binding or be enforceable.” 
91 These are collegiate structures carrying out supervision of specific market actors –such as banks– 
that operate on a cross-border basis; supervisory colleges are made of CSAs from the jurisdictions 
responsible for and participating in the supervision of those cross-border entities –see, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for effective supervisory colleges (Bank for 
International Settlements 2014) 1. 
92  See, for example, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Coordination, Supervision and 
Oversight of the Euronext Group, signed in March 2001 by the Authority for the Financial Markets 
(the Netherlands), the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (France), the Banking Finance and Insurance 
Commission (Belgium), and the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliarios (Portugal). 
93 See, for example: CEBS and CEIOPS, Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles (CEIOPS-
SEC-54/08 CEBS 2008 124 IWCFC 08 32). 
94 R. Lastra, ‘The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision In Europe’ (2003) 10 
ColumJEurL 49, 59. 
95 See recital 6 of: Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (2009/77/EC), O.J. 2009, L 25/18, Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 
establishing the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2009/78/EC), O.J. 2009, L 25/23, and 
Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors (2009/79/EC), O.J. 2009, L 25/28. 
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flows in the EU,96 creating deeper interconnectedness between the financial systems 
of the Member States and increasing the need for supervisory cooperation among 
CSAs. 97  Despite this, such cooperation faced important barriers. The financial 
supervisory patchwork in the EU was highly fragmented among CSAs with very 
different mandates, objectives and powers.98 In addition, as referred above, the EU 
level supervisory arrangements encompassed by the Lamfalussy architecture were 
limited in scope and non-binding.  
 
C. The global financial crisis of 2008 and the transformation of the EU financial 
supervisory cooperation architecture 
 
The global financial crisis exposed important flaws of the pre-crisis financial 
architecture in the EU, and the limitations of a nationally-based supervisory system; 
these were acknowledged by the Commission in its Communication on Financial 
Supervision published in the early stages of the financial crisis: “Current supervisory 
arrangements proved incapable of preventing, managing and resolving the crisis. 
Nationally based supervisory models have lagged behind the integrated and 
interconnected reality of today's European financial markets, in which many financial 
firms operate across borders. The crisis exposed serious failings in the cooperation, 
coordination, consistency and trust between national supervisors.”99 The roots of the 
reform leading to the post-crisis EU financial supervision architecture can be traced to 
the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (the de 
Larosiére Report), published in the year 2009.100 The High-Level Group was set up in 
the year 2008 by the Commission, which entrusted it with the formulation of 
recommendations about supervisory arrangements aimed at increasing the efficiency, 
integration and sustainability of financial supervision in the EU. 101 According to the 
de Larosiére Report, the weaknesses of the EU pre-crisis system of financial 
supervision 102  sourced from, inter alia, the lack of an EU macro-prudential 
supervisor,103 the flaws and inefficiencies of the cooperation arrangements between 
CSAs at the Member State level,104 as well as the limited resources and powers of the 
Lamfalussy Committees.105 The de Larosiére High-Level Group made proposals for 
the creation of a decentralized, but integrated and coordinated structure of financial 
supervision that would comprise new EU level macro and micro-prudential financial 
supervisors as well as the CSAs of the Member States.106 These proposals were 
supported by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council and resulted in the 
                                                
96 E. Papaioannou, S. Kalemli-Ozcan, and J.L. Peydró, ‘What is it good for? Absolutely for financial 
integration’, VoxEU, 20 June 2009. 
97 CESR, Which supervisory tools for the EU securities markets? Preliminary Progress Report 
(Himalaya Report) (Ref: 04-333f, 2004) 18. 
98 Lamfalussy Report, 15-16, and Himalaya Report, 18. 
99 Commission, Communication from the Commission: European financial supervision (COM(2009) 
252 final) 2. 
100 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report, 25 Feb. 2009. 
101 Commission, High Level Expert Group on EU financial supervision to hold first meeting on 12 
November, Press Release, 11 Nov. 2008. 
102 De Larosiére Report, notably 38-58. 
103 De Larosiére Report, 39-40. 
104 De Larosiére Report, 40-41. 
105 De Larosiére Report, 41-42. 
106 De Larosiére Report, 4, 46-48. 
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creation of a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) in the year 2010.107 
The ESFS is a network made of three pillars, each with its own institutional structures 
of financial regulation and supervision that operate in a coordinated manner, in charge 
of supervising of the EU’s financial system.108 
The first pillar relates to EU-wide systemic risk supervision.109 This is carried out 
by a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),110 which performs macro-prudential 
oversight of the EU financial system, with the primary aim of preventing and 
mitigating systemic risk,111 issuing, where necessary, warnings and recommendations 
addressed to the EU, its Member States, the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs), or CSAs.112 
The second pillar concerns micro-prudential regulation and supervision at the EU 
level. 113  This task is performed by three EU agencies, namely the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs).114 The ESAs are organized along sectoral lines and 
comprise the European Banking Authority (EBA),115 the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), 116  and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA).117 The ESAs carry out important quasi-regulatory and 
supervisory functions.118 On the rulemaking front, the ESAs develop guidelines and 
recommendations addressed to CSAs or financial market participants and targeted at, 
inter alia, promoting regulatory and supervisory convergence within the ESFS;119 
they also contribute to building a single rulebook for the EU financial markets 
through the creation of draft regulatory and implementing standards120 that develop 
technical aspects of EU financial sector laws.121 On the supervisory side, the ESAs 
monitor and assess market developments as well as their potential impact on financial 
                                                
107 Council, 3045th Council meeting Economic and Financial Affairs Brussels, Press Release 16369/10, 
17 Nov. 2010, 18-19. 
108 See, for instance, recital 14 and Art. 1.2 ESRB Regulation. 
109 Commission, COM(2009) 252 final, 3. 
110 The ESRB was instituted by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system 
and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, O.J. 2010, L 331/1 (ESRB Regulation). 
111 Art. 3.1 ESRB Regulation. 
112 Art. 16.2 ESRB Regulation. 
113 Commission, COM(2009) 252 final, 3. 
114 On the ESAs see Iglesias-Rodríguez (n 1) 193-196. 
115 The EBA was instituted by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, O.J. 
2010, L 331/12 (EBA Regulation). 
116 The EIOPA was instituted by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/79/EC, O.J. 2010, L 331/48 (EIOPA Regulation). 
117 The ESMA was instituted by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/77/EC, O.J. 2010, L 331/84 (ESMA Regulation). 
118 E. Wymeersch, ‘The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’ in E. Wymeersch, K. 
Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (eds.) (n 1). 
119 Art. 16.1 ESAs Regulations. 
120 Whereas the ESAs are entrusted with the drafting of technical standards, these are submitted to the 
Commission for consideration and approval through Regulations or Decisions –Arts. 10.1, 10.4, 15.1 
and 15.4 ESAs Regulations. The power of the Commission to adopt delegated acts and implementing 
acts is based on Art.  290 and 291 of the TFEU. 
121 See, for example, recitals 5 and 22 of ESMA Regulation, and of EBA Regulation. 
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market participants, providing, where necessary, recommendations aimed at 
preventing or remedying risks and vulnerabilities.122 They are also entrusted with the 
development of a common supervisory culture in the EU through actions that range 
from participating in the creation of uniform supervisory standards to promoting 
cooperation between CSAs.123  An important difference between the Lamfalussy 
Committees and the ESAs is that, unlike the former, the latter do have binding 
supervisory and enforcement powers. For example, in cases of disagreements between 
CSAs, the ESAs may settle the dispute through a binding decision requiring the CSAs 
concerned to adopt or refrain from certain actions.124 Moreover, the ESAs may adopt 
temporary bans or restrictions on certain financial products or activities which pose a 
threat to the “…orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability 
of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union…”.125 In addition, the ESAs 
have been given direct supervisory powers with respect to certain areas of the 
financial system; this is the case of credit rating agencies and trade repositories, which 
are directly supervised by ESMA,126 and, in relation to which, the latter may impose 
fines127 or withdraw registration.128 
The second pillar incorporates a forum of cooperation between the three ESAs, the 
Joint Committee, whose purpose is to ensure cross-sectoral consistency in regulation 
and supervision.129 
The third pillar regards the day-to-day macro-prudential and micro-prudential 
regulation, supervision and enforcement activities relating to markets and institutions 
at the Member State level. This is assigned to the CSAs from each jurisdiction.130  
The ESFS attributes a central role to cooperation among its various levels. As will 
be further explained below, this is reflected in, among others, the configuration of a 
detailed regime of cooperation duties among the constituents of the ESFS. 
The economic downturn that followed the financial crisis evidenced the close 
connections between banking crises and sovereign debt risk,131 as well as the dangers 
of spill over effects resulting from the latter within the euro area.132 The Commission 
                                                
122 Art. 32 ESAs Regulations. 
123 Art. 29 ESAs Regulations. 
124 Art. 19 ESAs Regulations. 
125 Art. 9.5 ESAs Regulations. For instance, Arts. 40 and 41 of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Regulation (MiFIR) (Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, O.J. 2014, L 173/84), 
respectively enable the ESMA and the EBA to adopt such prohibitions or restrictions. 
126 Title III of the Credit Rating Agencies Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies, O.J. 2009, L 302/1), and 
Title IV of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) (Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties 
and trade repositories, O.J. 2012, L 201/1). 
127 With respect to credit rating agencies, see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 946/2012 of 
12 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council with regard to rules of procedure on fines imposed to credit rating agencies by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority, including rules on the right of defence and temporal provisions, O.J. 
2012, L 282/23. 
128 With respect to trade repositories, see recital 74 and Art. 73 EMIR. 
129 Arts. 2.2(e) and 54 ESAs Regulations. 
130 See, for example, recital 9 ESMA Regulation, and Art. 2.2(f) ESAs Regulations. 
131 On the relationship between both, see P.R. Lane, ‘The European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (2012) 26 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 49, 59. 
132 On this topic see R.A. De Santis, ‘The Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis. Safe Haven, Credit Rating 
Agencies and the Spread of the Fever from Greece, Ireland and Portugal’, ECB Working Paper No. 
 18 
responded by proposing a Banking Union that would provide a system of common 
supervision, deposit protection, crisis management and resolution of banks in the 
EU. 133  This eventually materialized in the creation of a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) in the year 2013,134 of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in 
the year 2014,135 as well as in the formulation of proposals for a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) in the year 2015.136 In the Banking Union, supervision is 
assigned to the SSM, which is a supervisory system made of the ECB and relevant 
CSAs of the Member States.137 The SSM gives the ECB a pre-eminent role in the 
post-crisis EU financial architecture by entrusting it with the direct prudential 
supervision of significant credit institutions138 in the Eurozone and in other Member 
States that decide to join the SSM.139 CSAs remain responsible for the conduct of 
business supervision as well as the direct prudential supervision of less significant 
banks.140  
Both the ESFS and the Banking Union represent a shift from a system of fully 
decentralized supervision, primarily conducted at the Member State level –and 
organized through cooperation agreements between CSAs– towards a system of 
greater centralization of supervisory functions at the EU level, while remaining, 
nonetheless, a decentralized system with multiple supervisory actors. Such 
centralization has two main dimensions. First, in the new framework, there has been a 
transfer of direct supervisory responsibilities from the Member State to the EU level. 
For example, as indicated above, in the ESFS, the ESMA has direct supervision 
powers with respect to credit rating agencies and trade repositories. In the SSM, the 
ECB exercises direct prudential supervision of credit institutions throughout the 
EU.141 Second, in the post-crisis EU financial services architecture, EU entities, such 
as the ESAs, have assumed important responsibilities in the coordination of financial 
supervision EU-wide; an example are emergency situations in which there are 
developments that “may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of 
                                                                                                                                      
1419 (2012); and, R. Arezki, B. Candelon and A.N.R. Sy, ‘Sovereign Rating News and Financial 
Markets Spillovers: Evidence from the European Debt Crisis’, IMF Working Paper No. 11/68 (2011). 
133 Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A 
Roadmap towards a Banking Union (COM/2012/0510 final). 
134 The SSM was instituted by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions, O.J. 2013, L 287/63 (SSM Regulation), and by Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards 
the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013, O.J. 2013, L 287/5. 
135 The SRM was instituted by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a 
Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, O.J. 2014, L 225/1, (SRM 
Regulation). 
136 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme COM/2015/0586 final. 
137 Art. 2 SSM Regulation. 
138 Whether a credit institution is significant or not depends on a set of criteria related to: “(i) size; (ii) 
importance for the economy of the Union or any participating Member State; and (iii) significance of 
cross-border activities” –Art. 6.4 SSM Regulation. 
139 This includes the authorisation and withdrawal of authorisation of credit institutions –Art. 4 SSM 
Regulation. 
140 Centre for European Policy Studies, ECB Banking Supervision and Beyond (CEPS, 2014) 59. 
141 Recital 15 SSM Regulation. 
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financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the 
Union”; in those cases, the ESAs are entrusted with the facilitation and, even the 
coordination, of actions by CSAs of the Member States.142 In addition, the ESFS 
confers on the ESAs the task of “…promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective 
and consistent functioning of the colleges of supervisors…”.143 
The creation of the ESFS and the Banking Union, and the distribution of 
supervisory responsibilities within them to various actors along sectoral and 
functional lines have resulted in a multiplication of supervisory cooperation 
relationships. In the new setting, the performance of supervisory tasks by an authority 
operating in a given supervisory level –e.g. EU or Member State– may require the 
cooperation of other authorities in the same or other levels. Moreover, certain 
supervisory actions are entrusted to various authorities. The post-crisis supervisory 
patchwork embraces three types of cooperation relationships. In the first place, 
supervisory cooperation applies to the relationship between the various pillars within 
both the ESFS and the Banking Union; for example, the initiation and coordination of 
stress tests to assess the resilience of financial market participants is jointly performed 
by and requires cooperation between the ESAs and the ESRB.144 Likewise, in the 
SSM, the performance of tasks relating to consumer protection and anti-money 
laundering require cooperation between the ECB and Member State CSAs.145 Second, 
there is a need for cooperation within each of the pillars of the ESFS and of the 
Banking Union; for example, the ESFS envisages cooperation between the ESAs in 
relation to, inter alia, financial conglomerates and cross-sectoral matters.146 Third, 
supervisory cooperation also takes place between the ESFS and the Banking Union 
bodies, notably, with respect to matters of joint interest, and institutions operating 
across sectors.147 
The change in the nature of supervisory relationships has led to a redefinition of 
the EU regime of supervisory cooperation duties. The latter includes forms of both 
horizontal and vertical cooperation. 
On the one side, the general cooperation duties within the ESFS and the SSM 
encompass a notion of horizontal cooperation between their various constituent levels. 
With regard to the ESFS, the ESAs Regulations stipulate that: “In accordance with the 
principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, 
the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular 
in ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable information between them.”148 The 
SSM Regulation also implements a model of horizontal cooperation, between the 
ECB and the Member State CSAs: “Both the ECB and national competent authorities 
shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange 
information.”149 
In specific supervisory contexts, the relationship between different authorities is 
hierarchical and asymmetrical, giving rise to forms of vertical cooperation that 
embrace ascendancy of some supervisors over others. This is particularly the case in 
certain relationships between the EU supervisory authorities and the Member State 
                                                
142 Art. 18.1 ESAs Regulations. 
143 Recital 35 EIOPA Regulation and recital 36 ESMA and EBA Regulations. 
144 Art. 32 ESAs Regulations. 
145 Recital 29 SSM Regulation. 
146 Art. 54.2 ESAs Regulations. 
147 See, for example, recital 31 SSM Regulation. 
148 Art. 2.4 ESAs Regulations. 
149 Art. 6.2 SSM Regulation. 
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CSAs. For example, the general duties pertaining to exchange of information in the 
ESFS require that the CSAs of the Member States provide the ESAs information 
relevant to their supervisory functions, without establishing a corresponding duty for 
the ESAs: “At the request of the Authority [an ESA], the competent authorities of the 
Member States shall provide the Authority with all the necessary information to carry 
out the duties assigned to it… Upon a duly justified request from a competent 
authority of a Member State, the Authority may provide any information that is 
necessary to enable the competent authority to carry out its duties…” 150  The 
asymmetrical position of financial supervisors at the EU and Member State levels, 
respectively, is patent in areas where the former have direct supervisory powers; for 
example, in the SSM, the ECB may, in the exercise of its direct supervisory powers, 
issue instructions addressed to CSAs.151 
Both the ESFS and the Banking Union largely internalize the process of regulatory 
coordination on matters pertaining to supervisory cooperation through the creation of 
institutional mechanisms of joint decision-making led by CSAs from the Member 
States. For instance, the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors, whose voting members are the 
heads of the Member State CSAs,152 are the main decision-making bodies of the 
ESAs and their powers include the adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines 
and recommendations.153 Likewise, in the SSM, the formulation of rulemaking and 
supervisory decisions is entrusted to a Supervisory Board154 where most decision-
making power rests in representatives of the Member State CSAs.155 This Member 
State-based governance structure facilitates the debate and exchange of ideas among 
national authorities on matters pertaining to financial regulation and supervision, as 
well as to supervisory cooperation rules and processes,156 and, consequently, may 
contribute to foster the legitimacy of the latter. On the one side, from an input-
legitimacy viewpoint, the joint decision-making process enables the engagement of all 
the CSAs affected by and subject to EU-wide supervisory cooperation rules and 
policies, in their creation; moreover, the adoption of decisions regarding supervisory 
cooperation rules and processes often requires qualified majority within the ESAs and 
the ECB,157 and, hence, greater degrees of consensus among the Member State CSAs. 
                                                
150 See, for example, Art. 35 ESMA and EIOPA Regulations. 
151 Art. 6.3 SSM Regulation. 
152 Art. 40.1(b) ESAs Regulations.  
153 Arts. 43.1–2 ESAs Regulations. 
154 Art. 26.1 SSM Regulation.  
155 The Supervisory Board is composed of a Chair, a Vice-Chair, four representatives of the ECB and 
representatives of the CSAs in each participating Member State –Art. 26.1 SSM Regulation. 
156 The ESAs have been delegated powers for the development of norms applicable to supervisory 
cooperation in different areas of the financial system. For instance, under the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) (Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU, O.J. 2014, L 173/349), the ESMA has been delegated the adoption of draft 
implementing technical standards on “Standard forms, templates and procedures for competent 
authorities to cooperate in supervisory activities, on-site verifications, and investigations and for the 
exchange of information” –see Art. 80.4 MiFID II and ESMA, Final Report Draft implementing 
technical standards under MiFID II (ESMA/2015/1858), pp. 29-30; likewise, ESMA’s Draft 
Implementing Technical Standards on forms and procedures for cooperation between competent 
authorities under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 on market abuse (ESMA70-145-100), develop a 
comprehensive framework of supervisory cooperation among the various CSAs and levels of the ESFS 
in the field of market abuse. 
157 For instance, the adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines and recommendations by the 
ESAs requires a qualified majority of the voting members of their Boards of Supervisors –see EBA, 
Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Banking Authority Board of Supervisors 
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On the other side, as regards output legitimacy, the meetings of the Boards of 
Supervisors of the ESAs and of the Supervisory Board of the ECB operate as fora of 
transnational dialogue where CSAs can devise, together, supervisory cooperation 
policies tailored to their needs and expectations; this, in turn, may promote the 
acceptance of those policies among the CSAs concerned and further the effective 
functioning of financial sector supervisory cooperation in the EU. 
The post-crisis EU financial services supervision architecture examined in this 
section represents a shift towards a model of greater centralization and coordination 
of financial supervision, with potential benefits for the convergence, consistency and 
legitimacy of supervisory cooperation rules and procedures. 158  However, 
contemporarily, the model of centralized decentralization embraced by the ESFS and 
the Banking Union has substantially increased the complexity of the EU financial 
supervisory patchwork, which is now composed of a number of CSAs operating at 
various functional and jurisdictional levels and bound by an heterogeneous system of 
supervisory cooperation duties. This raises the question of whether and how EU law 
is able to deal with such complexity and guarantee the effective functioning of 
supervisory cooperation. In order to answer this question the next sections of this 
paper examine and assess key legal, regulatory and institutional aspects of the post-
crisis EU financial supervisory cooperation architecture, their impact on the ability 
and incentives of CSAs to cooperate with each other as well as their contribution to 
the process of development of a single market for financial services. 
 
 
V. SUPERVISORY COOPERATION DUTIES AND THEIR LIMITS: THE ROLE OF 
MEMBER STATES’ DISCRETION 
 
Cooperation duties are not unconditional. From the outset, EU instruments have 
embraced limitations to the duty to cooperate which give CSAs certain degrees of 
discretion as regards the decision whether or not to cooperate in specific scenarios. 
The regime concerning waivers from supervisory cooperation has been particularly 
developed in the securities field, notably by the ESMA’s Multilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding on Cooperation Arrangements and Exchange of Information 
(ESMA MMoU), 159  which contains detailed rules and procedures regarding 
cooperation among CSAs and between CSAs and the ESMA. According to the ESMA 
MMoU, there are three reasons that may justify a refusal to cooperate by a requested 
CSA.160 
                                                                                                                                      
(EBA/DC/2011/001 (Rev 4), Art. 3.5; EIOPA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority Board of Supervisors (EIOPA-BoS-11/002-
Rev3), Art. 4.2; and ESMA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority Board of Supervisors (ESMA/2012/BS/88 rev3), Art. 4.4. Also, in the SSM, the 
Supervisory Board takes decisions on draft regulations, which are used to develop important aspects of 
supervisory cooperation within the SSM –e.g. the Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European 
Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism–, by qualified majority of its members –see ECB, Rules of Procedure of the 
Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank (2014), Art. 6.5 and Art. 26.7 SSM Regulation. 
158 Indeed, stakeholders seem to acknowledge that the creation of the ESAs has generally improved 
cooperation between CSAs – see European Parliament, Review of the New European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS). Part 1: The Work of the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, 
EIOPA And ESMA) –The ESFS’s Micro-Prudential Pillar (IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-23) 143. 
159 ESMA/2014/608. 
160 Art. 3.4 ESMA MMoU. 
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The first is that the request of cooperation falls outside the scope of the ESMA 
MMoU.161 This would, however, be a highly unlikely scenario, first and foremost 
because the ESMA MMoU offers a rather comprehensive list of potential areas and 
modes of cooperation.162 In addition, the wording of the ESMA MMoU leaves an 
open door to the inclusion of areas and forms of cooperation not expressly addressed 
by it; for instance, when referring to the subject-matter of cooperation, the ESMA 
MMoU stipulates that: “assistance includes but is not limited to matters relating 
to…”163; likewise, with respect to the forms of cooperation, the ESMA MMoU 
establishes that: “The scope of assistance available from the Requested Authority 
shall include, inter alia…”164 In any event, a refusal to cooperate based on the above-
mentioned justification, would only apply to requests of cooperation grounded on the 
ESMA MMoU. Therefore, a requested CSA may be entitled to withhold cooperation 
under the ESMA MMoU and, yet, be required to provide cooperation, if it is 
compelled to do so by EU or national laws. 
The second reason that may warrant the withholding of cooperation by a requested 
CSA, according to the ESMA MMoU, is that the law of a Member State allows such a 
refusal to cooperate.165 This is, however, restricted to requests that are not grounded 
on EU law –i.e. when the requesting authority is not invoking a cooperation duty set 
in an EU Directive and/or Regulation. The progressive process of harmonization of 
EU securities laws has broadened the catalogue of areas of financial regulation 
subject to EU law and, consequently, to EU law-based cooperation duties, reducing, 
in turn, the scope of Member State law-based waivers from cooperation.  
Third, a refusal to cooperate may be founded upon an exception to the duty to 
cooperate acknowledged by EU law.166 The EU legislator has not adopted a uniform 
approach to the treatment of these exceptions; as a result, the regime regarding the 
waivers from cooperation is a fragmented one and the scope of the CSAs’ cooperation 
duties varies according to the specific EU law or instrument under which a request of 
cooperation is issued.  
As will be shown in this section, EU law waivers from supervisory cooperation 
pursue the protection of legitimate rights and interests that might be threatened by the 
actual provision of cooperation in particular cases. However, at the same time, those 
very same waivers give CSAs discretion as regards the interpretation of when and the 
extent to which such threats exist. Consequently, there is the potential risk of CSAs 
biasedly interpreting and invoking exceptions to the duty to cooperate in order to 
withhold cooperation in an opportunistic manner. This section carries out a twofold 
analysis. First, it identifies the various exceptions to the duty to cooperate embraced 
by EU instruments and assesses the scope for their potential misuse. Second, it 
examines the evolution of the legal treatment of those exceptions in order to answer 
an important question: has the process of integration of EU financial supervision led 
to a narrowing of the scope of the exceptions to the duty to cooperate and, 
consequently, to more limited degrees of discretion of the Member State CSAs in 
supervisory cooperation decisions?  
 
 
                                                
161 Art. 3.4(a) ESMA MMoU. 
162 See, for example, Arts. 3.2 and 3.3 ESMA MMoU. 
163 Art. 3.2 ESMA MMoU. 
164 Art. 3.3. ESMA MMoU. 
165 Art. 3.4(c) ESMA MMoU. 
166 Art. 3.4(b) ESMA MMoU. 
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A. Waivers from supervisory cooperation grounded on the interest of a Member State 
 
A first category of waivers from the duty to cooperate refers to instances in which the 
provision of cooperation would have a negative effect on the protection of the interest 
–this concept broadly understood– of the Member State of the requested CSA. For 
example, some FSAP Directives –such as the Directive 2003/6/EC –Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD)– 167  and the Directive 2004/39/EC –Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID)– 168 allowed CSAs to withhold cooperation when the 
latter “might adversely affect the sovereignty, security or public policy of the State 
addressed”.169 The IOSCO MMoU also contemplates the possibility of a requested 
CSA denying cooperation “on grounds of public interest or essential national 
interest”.170 These public interest-related exceptions gave CSAs substantial freedom 
in the interpretation of their duty to cooperate and, ultimately, in the decision of 
whether or not to cooperate in a specific case, opening the door to potentially 
protectionist behaviors; for instance, a requested CSA could use public interest-
related exceptions opportunistically, withholding the exchange of information about 
firms operating in critical sectors -–e.g. energy, military– or with major relevance for 
the economy, even in cases in which cooperation would pose no actual threat to the 
sovereignty, security or public policy in the Member State of the requested CSA. EU 
laws have progressively limited the scope of waivers related to the protection of the 
interest of a Member State and, thus, the ability of CSAs to refuse cooperation on 
such grounds; for example, the Regulation No 596/2014 –Market Abuse Regulation 
(MAR)–, 171  which repeals the MAD, removed the references to threats to the 
“sovereignty” and “public policy”, and focused, instead, on cases in which the 
provision of cooperation “…could adversely affect the security of the Member State 
addressed, in particular the fight against terrorism and other serious crimes”.172 
MiFID II, which partially recasts the MiFID, plainly eliminates any reference to 
waivers linked to the protection of the interest of a Member State.173 Nonetheless, 
CSAs would still be entitled to deny cooperation in instances of threats to national 
security, as the latter is a Treaty-based exclusive competence of the EU Member 
States.174 
 
B. Waivers from supervisory cooperation grounded on the principle of Ne Bis In Idem 
 
A second category of waivers relates to instances of res sub judice and res judicata, 
and provides protection against double jeopardy through the principle of ne bis in 
idem. These anti-double jeopardy exceptions, which are common in EU laws and 
                                                
167 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider 
dealing and market manipulation, O.J. 2003, L 96/16. 
168 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets 
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172 Art. 25.2(a) MAR. 
173 Art. 83 MiFID II. 
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MoUs in the financial field, allow CSAs to withhold cooperation in two scenarios. 
First, when judicial proceedings have already been initiated with regard to the same 
actions and the same persons before the authorities of the Member State of the 
requested CSA.175 Secondly, when final judgment has already been delivered in the 
Member State of the requested CSA with regard to the same persons and the same 
actions.176 These waivers do, however, pose certain problems of interpretation that 
will be examined in the next paragraphs. As will be shown, the evolution of the legal 
treatment of the anti-double jeopardy exceptions –from their initial wording in the 
FESCO and CESR MoUs to their current form– evidences that, overall, their scope 
has been progressively broadened, and, consequently, the ability of CSAs to refuse 
cooperation, increased. 
The first question relates to the subject-matter jurisdictions covered by the anti-
double jeopardy waivers. Whereas the FESCO and the CESR MoUs explicitly limited 
the lis pendens waivers to “…judicial proceedings for the imposition of criminal 
penalties…”,177 the reference to “criminal penalties” is absent in most post-FSAP and 
post-crisis EU financial laws, which merely make reference to “judicial proceedings,” 
without specifying any particular subject-matter. This raises the question of whether a 
refusal to cooperate might be grounded on the existence of judicial proceedings 
pertaining to matters beyond the criminal realm. Whereas the application of the 
principle of ne bis in idem has traditionally been limited to (national) criminal 
justice,178 over the years, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has construed it as a (transnational) general principle of EU law, not 
necessarily limited to the criminal jurisdiction but, instead, extendable to other types 
of judicial processes with a punitive nature.179 The omission of the reference to 
“criminal penalties” may suggest that anti-double jeopardy waivers embrace such EU 
law trend and extend to non-criminal jurisdictions –e.g. civil jurisdiction cases. The 
practical effect of this approach is that the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation 
would be broadened. 
A second issue regards to whether anti-double jeopardy waivers only apply to 
judicial proceedings/decisions or also include administrative actions –for example, 
when a requested CSA has already imposed a fine to a firm in relation to which the 
requesting CSA solicits information. According to both the FESCO MoU and the 
CESR MoU, administrative decisions were included in the anti-double jeopardy 
waivers. In this respect, the former read: “…where a non-appealable judicial or 
administrative sanction has already been imposed…”,180 and the latter referred to 
instances “…where final judgement has already been passed or administrative 
sanctions have already been applied…”.181 In contrast, in force MoUs and EU laws in 
the financial field seem to only explicitly include judicial decisions.182 Traditionally, 
EU law has adopted an ambiguous approach to the treatment of administrative 
sanctions in the context of ne bis in idem, often excluding administrative punitive 
decisions from a strict application of such principle, with the result that the same facts 
                                                
175 See e.g. Art. 83(a) MiFID II and Art. 25.2(c) MAD.  
176 See e.g. Art. 83(b) MiFID II and 25.2(d) MAR.  
177 See e.g. Art. 3.3 of the FESCO MoU and of the CESR MoU. 
178 See J.A.E. Vervaele, ‘The transnational ne bis in idem principle in the EU Mutual recognition and 
equivalent protection of human rights’ (2005) 1 Utrecht Law Review 100, 100. 
179 See J.A.E. Vervaele (n 178) 106, and B. Van Bockel, The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in EU Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2010) 223. 
180 Art. 3.3 FESCO MoU. 
181 Art. 3.3 CESR MoU. 
182 See, for example, Art. 25.2(d) MAR.  
 25 
could result in sanctions at various jurisdictional levels.183 Whereas some recent 
decisions of the CJEU encompass the notion that administrative punitive decisions 
would bar double prosecution,184 certain post-crisis EU legislative developments seem 
to take a very different view. For instance, the MAR acknowledges the possibility of 
the same offence being subject to both criminal and administrative sanctions.185 
Recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has taken a much 
clearer stand, arguing that administrative enforcement and criminal prosecution for 
the same actions are incompatible. Of particular relevance for financial market 
practice, is the decision of the ECHR in Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy. Grande 
Stevens and other defendants who committed market manipulation were, first, fined 
administratively by the Italian securities supervisor –the Commissione Nazionale per 
le Società e la Borsa (Consob)–186 and, subsequently, subject to criminal proceedings 
for the same facts. The ECHR argued that this constitutes a breach of the principle of 
ne bis in idem embraced by article 4 of Protocol 7 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights –regarding the right not to be tried or punished twice. In the 
framework of cooperation between CSAs, it remains unclear what the scope of anti-
double jeopardy waivers would be, in this respect. Even a full encompassment, by EU 
law and case law, of the applicability of the ne bis in idem principle to administrative 
sanctions, would not necessarily extend to cooperation duties of CSAs –but, rather, to 
their enforcement procedures. The silence of in force anti-double jeopardy waivers on 
this matter, jointly with their emphasis on “judicial” decisions, would indicate that the 
intention of the EU legislator was to exclude administrative sanctions from the scope 
of such waivers. This would, in turn, limit the ability of CSAs to decline cooperation. 
For instance, the fact that the requested authority had already imposed a fine with 
regard to the same persons and actions would not, per se, enable it to withhold 
cooperation. 
A third important question refers to the extent to which anti-double jeopardy 
waivers also embrace instances in which the request of assistance is not aimed at 
bringing judicial proceedings or punitive administrative enforcement against a person 
involved in the actions to which the request of cooperation refers, for those very same 
actions –and/or may not result in those proceedings being brought in the jurisdiction 
of the requesting CSA. This would, for example, be the case of a request for 
cooperation about facts relating to and/or persons involved in a given securities laws 
violation, when such a request is merely instrumental to another supervisory or 
enforcement procedure relating to different actions and/or persons. The FESCO MoU 
offered a rather straightforward answer to this question by limiting the applicability of 
the anti-double jeopardy waivers to instances in which “…the provision of assistance 
might result in a judicial or administrative sanction being imposed… in the 
jurisdiction of the Requested Authority, in respect of the same actions and against the 
same persons”.187 A similar approach is found in the IOSCO MMoU, which permits 
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the requested CSA to refuse cooperation “…unless the Requesting Authority can 
demonstrate that the relief or sanctions sought in any proceedings initiated by the 
Requesting Authority would not be of the same nature or duplicative of any relief or 
sanctions obtained in the jurisdiction of the Requested Authority”. 188  This is, 
however, an aspect in relation to which contemporary EU MoUs and legislation are 
silent, hence opening the door to rigid interpretations that could back the withholding 
of cooperation, just because a given request refers to the same actions and persons. 
 
C. Waivers from supervisory cooperation grounded on the interest of a competent 
supervisory authority 
 
There is a third category of cooperation waivers aimed at protecting administrative 
investigation and enforcement activities in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA. 
Such type of waiver was introduced in the year 2014 by the MAR, which allows a 
requested CSA to deny cooperation when: “complying with the request is likely 
adversely to affect its own investigation, enforcement activities or, where applicable, 
a criminal investigation”.189 Although the reference to “its own investigation and 
enforcement activities” can be interpreted as referring to supervision regarding the 
same actions and persons to which the request of cooperation refers, the subsequent 
allusion to “a criminal investigation” seems to have a broader scope; for example, it 
may be interpreted as including criminal investigations by the requested CSA, relating 
to different persons and/or actions –or even, more generally, to criminal investigations 
conducted in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA by bodies different from the latter. 
To a certain extent, the MAR expands the cooperation waivers from the judicial to 
the, primarily administrative, non-judicial stage of an investigation and/or 
enforcement action, but with a more restricted character, i.e. only when the provision 
of cooperation has a likely negative effect on investigation and/or enforcement 
activities in the requested jurisdiction. From the point of view of the rights of the 
CSAs of different Member States involved in a given investigation, this waiver from 
cooperation poses some problems, because it implicitly attributes greater weight and 
primacy to an investigation and/or enforcement activity in the jurisdiction of the 
requested CSA –which is entitled to decline cooperation– than to an investigation 
and/or enforcement action in the jurisdiction of the requesting CSA, which may 
equally suffer negative effects if the requested CSA withholds cooperation on the 
grounds of the interest of its own investigations.  
The analysis of the evolution of the content of the exceptions to the duty to 
cooperate from their early configuration in the FESCO and CESR MoUS to their 
current form –for example, in force EU Directives and Regulations– shows that, 
whereas the scope of some waivers has been narrowed, in certain instances it has been 
expanded and, consequently, the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation increased. 
Indeed, despite the greater degrees of supervisory integration and centralization 
brought by the post-de Larosiére framework, the regime concerning supervisory 
cooperation exceptions still grants considerable discretion to the Member State CSAs. 
One of the risks of such regime lies in its lack of clarity and definition, opening the 
door to dissimilar interpretations across the Member States. More importantly, it may 
result in potential opportunistic behaviors by CSAs, which may justify the 
withholding of cooperation on the basis of biased readings of the exceptions to the 
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duty to cooperate. Ultimately, disagreeing interpretations of the scope of the duties –
and exceptions– to cooperate brings about the risk of increased supervisory dissent 
across the EU. 
The next section examines and assesses post-crisis regulatory developments that 
have instituted mechanisms of solution of disagreements among CSAs, including 
instances of supervisory cooperation disputes. 
 
 
VI. THE ESFS, THE EMERGENCE OF THE ESAS AS SETTLERS OF 
SUPERVISORY COOPERATION DISPUTES, AND THE INCENTIVES OF CSAS TO 
COOPERATE 
 
An important development brought about by the ESFS consisted of the 
institutionalization of a rather formal dispute settlement framework in which the 
ESAs are given extensive powers to resolve disagreements between CSAs. These 
powers are instrumental to the attainment of one of the key tasks of the ESAs, namely 
enhancing the consistent application of legally binding Union acts. 190  Such 
consistency may be hindered when, for example, CSAs have different views about 
whether and how they are expected to cooperate with each other or with the ESAs –as 
required by EU law.  
The ESAs have been vested with various mechanisms, some general and others ad 
hoc, that can be used to address instances of lack of compliance with cooperation 
duties by CSAs. In contrast with the Lamfalussy Committees, some of these 
mechanisms embrace the use of binding powers by the ESAs. The allocation of 
dispute settlement powers to the ESAs raises various questions that are relevant to 
understand and assess the post-crisis transformation of supervisory cooperation in the 
EU. A first question relates to the nature, scope and limitations of the ESAs’ 
instruments of dispute settlement. The answer to this question is useful to respond to a 
second question, namely, whether and why these new mechanisms of dispute 
settlement may have an actual impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate. 
Thirdly, by performing a quasi-judicial role in relation to CSAs, the ESAs are 
potentially subject to conflicts of interest that may affect their ability to solve disputes 
in an unbiased manner; it is, hence, important to understand the sources of such 
conflicts as well as the extent to which these are properly tackled by the EU 
regulatory and institutional frameworks. 
The next sections explore these issues through an analysis of the nature, scope and 
potential effects of the ESAs’ dispute settlement mechanisms, in respect of both the 
ESFS and the Banking Union.  
 
A. The mediation mechanism of article 19 of the ESAs Regulations: scope and 
limitations 
 
The core mechanism of dispute settlement between CSAs is provided by article 19 of 
the ESAs Regulations, whereby the ESAs may mediate between CSAs in cases 
“…where a competent authority disagrees about the procedure or content of an action 
or inaction of a competent authority…in cases specified in [legally binding Union 
acts]…”.191 This provision embraces, inter alia, instances of cooperation disputes 
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between CSAs, such as those arising when a requested CSA refuses to provide 
information to a requesting CSA. The reference to both ‘content’ and ‘procedure’ 
amplifies the reach of the ESAs’ mediation powers to, not only cases in which a 
request of cooperation is rejected, but also instances in which a requesting CSA is not 
satisfied with the quality of the cooperation provided –e.g. if the requesting CSA 
deems the information provided by the requested CSA to be incomplete or 
inadequate. 
The mediation mechanism of article 19 consists of a one-to-three step process, 
where progression to each consecutive step depends on whether a solution is reached 
or not in the previous. 
In step one (conciliation), an ESA mediates between the CSAs in disagreement, 
assisting them in the reaching of a solution. The conciliation step may be initiated at 
the request of CSA(s) or on an ESA’s own initiative –in the latter case, whenever the 
disagreement can be determined on the basis of objective criteria.192 The role of an 
ESA at this stage is that of a mere facilitator of cooperation between the CSAs in 
dispute.193 If the CSAs do not reach a solution within a time limit specified by the 
relevant ESA,194 then the latter may decide to proceed to step 2. 
In step two (binding mediation), an ESA adopts a binding decision addressed to the 
CSAs in dispute that settles the disagreement, by requiring them to take specific 
action or refrain from it.195 An example would be a decision whereby a requested 
CSA must provide certain information to a requesting CSA. Step two-decisions are 
binding and, therefore, CSAs are expected to comply with them. However, if they do 
not do so, then an ESA may proceed to step three. 
In step three (direct binding decision), an ESA adopts an individual decision 
addressed to a financial market participant, requiring it to take specific action or 
refrain from it.196 This mechanism is aimed at guaranteeing that, when a CSA does 
not comply with a binding mediation decision, the market participants concerned 
follow courses of action that, somehow, overcome the failure of a CSA to observe an 
ESA’s settlement. 
The mediation process is led by Mediation Panels within each ESA.197 These 
panels are appointed by the respective Boards of Supervisors and composed of the 
Chair of an ESA plus two members –six in the EBA– of its Board of Supervisors who 
neither represent the CSAs in disagreement nor have direct links with the latter or any 
interest in the dispute.198 The decisions of a Mediation Panel with a proposed binding 
settlement are forwarded to the relevant Board of Supervisors for final adoption,199 
which generally requires simple majority of its members.200 
The powers of the ESAs under article 19 are much more extensive than those held 
by the Lamfalussy Committees. In the first place, the powers of the Lamfalussy 
Committees were not binding,201 unlike those of the ESAs, which may settle a 
disagreement between CSAs through a binding decision. Second, the ESAs can, at 
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their own discretion –where disagreements are objectively determinable–, step into a 
dispute and initiate a mediation process, whereas the Lamfalussy Committees were 
able to play a mediation role, only after a request from a CSA.202  
Despite the width of the powers granted to the ESAs under article 19, there are 
some important limitations and interpretative problems regarding their application to 
instances of supervisory dissent. 
First, the mechanism of article 19 can only be applied when an EU legally binding 
act explicitly backs such use –and only for the purposes specified in it.203 EU financial 
sector Directives and Regulations take different stances in this respect, some being 
more restrictive than others. For example, article 82 of MiFID II embraces a far-
reaching application of article 19, enabling its use to address disagreements between 
CSAs “where a request relating to one of the following has been rejected or has not 
been acted upon within a reasonable time: (a) to carry out a supervisory activity, an 
on-the-spot verification, or an investigation, as provided for in Article 80; or (b) to 
exchange information as provided for in Article 81.” In contrast, article 23.4 of the 
Regulation No 236/2012 (Short Selling Regulation),204 provides for a more narrow 
application of article 19, limiting its use to instances where “a competent authority 
disagrees with the action taken by another competent authority on a financial 
instrument traded on different venues regulated by different competent authorities…” 
Second, step two and step three of the mediation mechanism require the existence 
of a breach of EU law, which the mediation process aims to put to an end to. For 
example, as indicated above, when a requested CSA withholds information that a 
requesting authority has the right to access and which the requested CSA ought to 
provide –according to the general duty of cooperation between CSAs and/or concrete 
cooperation duties set in EU financial laws–, there would be a breach of EU law and 
the ESA concerned would, hence, be entitled to use a step two-binding decision to 
settle the disagreement –if the conciliatory phase failed. However, cooperation 
disputes founded on breaches of domestic laws establishing specific cooperation 
duties would be excluded from this mediation mechanism, as long as they do not 
imply a breach of EU law. Likewise, discretionary actions by Member State CSAs, 
based on explicit or implicit EU legislative delegations, are shielded from and cannot 
be superseded by ESA’s binding mediation decisions, as long as the exercise of such 
discretion is in compliance with EU law.205 
In addition, the general applicability of step three-decisions to supervisory 
cooperation disputes is questionable. In this respect, section 3 of article 19 of the 
ESAs Regulations stipulates that: “…where a competent authority does not comply 
with the decision of the Authority, and thereby fails to ensure that a financial market 
participant complies with requirements directly applicable to it by virtue of the acts 
referred to in Article 1(2), the Authority may adopt an individual decision addressed 
to a financial market participant requiring the necessary action to comply with its 
obligations under Union law…”. Therefore, article 19.3 seems to limit the 
applicability of direct binding decisions to instances in which lack of compliance of a 
CSA with an ESA’s binding mediation decision also results in and/or implies lack of 
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compliance of a market participant with EU law.206 This is, however, not necessarily 
the case in cooperation disputes. For instance, when a CSA does not abide by a 
binding decision of an ESA, it may be breaching EU law –for example, general 
cooperation duties– without this necessarily resulting in a consequential breach of EU 
law by a market participant. These limitations to the powers of the ESAs in the use of 
step two and step three-decisions are, indeed, consistent with the Meroni doctrine, 
according to which EU institutions cannot delegate discretionary powers that involve 
wide margins of discretion.207  
Third, the safeguard clause of article 38 of the ESAs Regulations, whereby step 
two-mediation decisions must not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the 
Member States, might also pose some limitations to the use of binding mediation by 
an ESA, notably in the context of resolution disputes.208 If a Member State considers 
that there is such an impingement, it may trigger a procedure that involves the binding 
decision of the ESA being suspended, reconsidered by the latter, and whenever 
maintained, subject to scrutiny by the Council, which decides whether to uphold it or 
not.209 Nevertheless, owing to the creation of the Single Resolution Mechanism and 
the transfer of resolution authority to the Single Resolution Board, the room for 
decisions of an ESA regarding resolution disputes with an impact on the fiscal 
responsibilities of the member states is more reduced and so is the scope for invoking 
a breach of article 38. 
In addition to the procedure for the challenge of decisions of article 38 of the ESAs 
Regulations, which is restricted to instances when an ESA’s binding decision invades 
the fiscal responsibilities of a member state, CSAs are entitled to challenge mediation 
decisions adopted by the ESAs before the ESAs’ Board of Appeal,210 and, eventually, 
before the Court of Justice of the EU;211 this remedy could for instance be used when 
a CSA deems an ESA’s decision arbitrary or adopted without following applicable 
statutory procedural requirements. 
A potential additional restriction of the mediation mechanism of article 19 relates 
to the nature of the organs in charge of adopting binding decisions. The voting power 
within both the Mediation Panels and the Boards of Supervisors –which are in charge 
of proposing and adopting binding decisions, respectively– is primarily concentrated 
in representatives of CSAs;212 it is unclear the extent to which these may be able to 
vote impartially, merely on the facts of the dispute at stake in a given case. The 
political economy of voting in binding mediation processes may be influenced by 
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factors such as the relationships and mutual interests between the voting members of a 
Board of Supervisors and the CSAs in dispute; this may in turn create distortions, 
especially when voting procedures are not secret.213 For example, a member of a 
Board of Supervisors may be reluctant to cast a vote against the interest of a certain 
CSA in a particular cooperation dispute for fear of negative repercussions in the 
cooperation relationships with that CSA in the future. 
 
1. Does the mediation mechanism of article 19 of the ESAs Regulations have an 
impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate? 
 
In order to assess whether and how the mediation procedure of article 19 may impact 
supervisory cooperation between CSAs, it is first important to understand the costs 
resulting from its application –especially when it escalates to step two– on both the 
requesting and requested CSAs. 
On the one side, a binding mediation of an ESA overturning a non-cooperation 
decision of a requested CSA may result in certain costs for the latter. 
In the first place, the binding decision will have the immediate result of compelling 
the CSA concerned to perform an action –e.g the forwarding of information to the 
requesting CSA– that it likely deems prejudicial to its own interests and/or the 
interests of actors that it is bound to protect, such as investors or consumers of 
financial services in its jurisdiction. 
Second, a binding mediation may limit the discretion of a CSA in deciding whether 
to cooperate or not in the future, because its decisions in that regard will be largely 
bound by what an ESA has ruled in prior binding mediation procedures.  In this 
respect, the binding mediation constitutes a quasi-regulatory tool through which the 
ESAs can shape the behavior of CSAs, by signaling the preferences of the former 
about the extent and scope of cooperation that the latter are expected to provide in 
similar instances as those being subject to a mediation process. It follows that a CSA 
whose decision not to cooperate in a particular case has been overturned by an ESA, 
may, in the future, adjust its supervisory behavior to the expectations of such ESA –
even when those supervisory courses of action are contrary to the policy views and 
preferences of the CSA concerned–, in order to avoid the threat of binding mediation 
processes being initiated. 
Third, owing to the fact that binding mediation decisions must be approved by the 
Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs,214 and that, consequently, the nature and scope of 
the disagreements are made known to fellow CSAs within an ESA,215 the reputation 
of the CSAs whose non-cooperative actions are upturned, vis-à-vis other CSAs, may 
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be hindered –especially whenever an ESA justifies its binding decision on an alleged 
lack of consistency and/or reasonableness of the requested CSA’s behavior. 
Because binding mediation may bring about important costs for a requested CSA, 
the latter will tailor its behavior to the assessment of the likeliness of an ESA’s 
mediation process being initiated, either at the demand of the requesting CSA or on an 
ESA’s own initiative. Likewise, the threat of binding mediation may contribute to 
deter a requested CSA from arbitrary or inconsistent non-cooperation decisions that 
could potentially trigger the mediation process –or, if the latter is initiated, to revise 
its decision in the conciliatory phase. 
On the other side, a decision adopted by an ESA in the context of a binding 
mediation may also create costs for the requesting CSA. By submitting a dispute to an 
ESA for mediation, the requesting authority is, in fact, shifting decisional power away 
from the requested CSA to the relevant ESA. Hence, the mere request of an ESA’s 
intervention through mediation may harm the trust of the requested authority in the 
requesting authority, impairing the relationships between them.216 This may, in turn, 
affect the quality of future cooperation; for instance, a requested CSA may be more 
reluctant to voluntarily disclose unsolicited information that could, nonetheless, be 
useful for the requesting CSA. 
A requesting CSA will apply for an ESA’s mediation if the potential costs 
resulting from such a request are lower than the potential benefits of the provision of 
cooperation stemming from an ESA’s mediation. This will, most likely, be limited to 
very relevant supervisory procedures –e.g. with a major impact on the markets and 
actors in the jurisdiction of the requesting CSA– and where the probability of an 
ESA’s decision upholding the requesting CSA’s demands vis-à-vis the requested CSA 
are high –e.g. if and when the grounds for lack of cooperation by the requested CSA 
are weak. 
The data regarding the use of mediation by the ESAs would support the hypothesis 
of article 19’s deterrent effect. For instance, since the ESAs became operative, only 
the EBA applied the mediation process of article 19; this happened in two occasions, 
both in the year 2014, and, in both cases, the disagreement was settled in step one of 
the process, that is, in the conciliation phase.217 In its Annual Report of the year 2015, 
the EBA did, indeed, highlight its pre-eminently informal role in the settlement of 
disagreements between CSAs: “Although there have been several cases of 
disagreements between CAs, during 2015 the EBA has not been approached with a 
request to provide its assistance in one of these formal procedures on mediation. 
Nonetheless, the EBA played an important role in providing its assistance to settle 
disagreements between CAs in an informal way”.218The Commission’s review of the 
ESFS acknowledged the potentially dissuasive effect of the binding mediation 
mechanism, recognizing, at the same time, the “lack of clarity” of the ESAs 
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Regulations with respect to the scope of binding mediation, suggesting that this may 
be addressed in future reforms of the ESAs Regulations.219 
 
2. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, The Single Resolution Mechanism and the 
role of the EBA as a mediator between the Banking Union EU level supervisory 
structures and Member State CSAs 
 
The creation of the SSM and the SRM and the allocation of direct supervisory 
responsibilities within these structures to the ECB and the SRB, respectively, have led 
to a reconfiguration of the supervisory relationships within the EU financial 
supervision architecture. Under the SSM and the SRM, both the ECB and the SRB are 
bound by cooperation duties vis-à-vis CSAs and the EBA as well as between each 
other. Supervisory cooperation is given a central role within the SSM: “It is essential 
for the smooth functioning of the SSM that there is full cooperation between the ECB 
and NCAs and that they exchange all the information that may have an impact on 
their respective tasks…” 220  Likewise, the SRM Regulation embraces close 
supervisory cooperation of the SRB with the EBA –and, where appropriate, also with 
the ESRB, the ESMA, the EIOPA and other supervisory authorities in the ESFS–, the 
ECB and other supervisory authorities within the SSM, as well as with resolution 
authorities.221 
Under the EBA Regulation, both the ECB and the SRB are deemed CSAs and, 
hence, subject to the EBA’s supervisory remit. 222  The regulatory framework 
acknowledges the applicability of the EBA’s mediation mechanism to supervisory 
cooperation disputes involving the ECB and the SRB. As regards the ECB, the EBA’s 
Rules of Procedure for the Settlement of Disagreements between Competent 
Authorities, stipulate that: “In view of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB by 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the EBA should be able to carry out its tasks also in 
relation to the ECB in the same manner as in relation to the other competent 
authorities.”223 Also, the SRM Regulation recognizes that, for the purposes of the 
Directive 2014/59/EU –Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)–, the SRB 
is bound by the EBA’s mediation decisions.224  
The scope of applicability of the mediation mechanism is more limited in respect 
of the SRB than the ECB. This is because, according to the EBA Regulation, the SRB 
will be considered a CSA –and, hence, subject to the EBA’s mediation processes and 
decisions– only when and if it is not exercising discretionary powers or making policy 
choices.225 Owing to the fact that supervision and resolution tasks generally embrace 
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the exercise of margins of discretion, the potential role of the EBA as a settler of 
disagreements involving the SRB will be very narrow.226 
The efficient functioning of the principal-agent institutional design, on which both 
the SSM and the SRM are based,227 requires a smooth interaction between EU level 
CSAs –namely, the ECB and the SRB– on the one side, and the Member State CSAs 
on the other. For instance, in the SSM, the ECB largely relies on CSAs for the 
enforcement of prudential regulation228 and, in the SRM, the SRB delegates the 
execution of resolution schemes to national resolution authorities.229 In addition, the 
SSM and the SRM are mutually dependent and require a close cooperation between 
the ECB and the SRB in tasks such as the development of recovery and resolution 
plans.230 For reasons similar to those explained above with regard to the ESFS, the 
activation of the mediation mechanism could lead to costs for both requesting and 
requested CSAs within the SSM and the SRM. Therefore, it would most likely be 
relied upon only as a last resort mechanism in exceptional circumstances. 
 
B. Disagreements between the ESAs and CSAs: the ESAs as interested parties and 
judges 
 
As has been explained in the preceding subsections, the ESFS encompasses a series of 
supervisory cooperation duties between the ESAs and CSAs, raising the possibility of 
disagreements about the rationale, grounds, extent and scope of those duties in 
concrete supervisory scenarios. 
Although the ESAs Regulations do not offer ad hoc mechanisms of settlement of 
cooperation disputes between the ESAs and CSAs, they, nevertheless, embrace 
instruments that can be used for such purpose. An example is article 17 of the ESAs 
Regulations, which institutes a three-level procedure to address breaches of EU law 
by CSAs. In the first stage, an ESA is empowered to investigate alleged breaches of 
EU law by a CSA and to issue recommendations directed to the latter with indications 
on the steps to take so as to remedy such breaches.231 If the CSA concerned fails to 
comply with the recommendation, then there is a second stage where the Commission 
may issue a formal opinion, requiring the CSA to take action to comply with EU 
law.232 Lastly, if the CSA fails to observe the Commission’s opinion, then the process 
may move to a third stage where an ESA is vested with the power to issue an 
individual binding decision directly addressed to a financial institution, in order to 
remedy the lack of compliance with EU law.233 
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Whereas the mechanism envisaged by article 17 of the ESAs Regulations is 
primarily aimed at tackling instances in which a CSA fails to ensure that supervised 
entities comply with EU financial sector laws,234 its scope of applicability is broad, as 
it may be used by an ESA “Where a competent authority has not applied the acts 
referred to in Article 1(2), or has applied them in a way which appears to be a breach 
of Union law…”.235 On the one side, this would include cases where a CSA fails to 
comply with cooperation duties vis-à-vis other CSAs but where there is no apparent 
express disagreement between the CSAs concerned and the mechanism of article 19 is 
not deployed.236 On the other side, it could also comprise instances in which a CSA 
breaches cooperation duties set in EU acts vis-à-vis the ESAs. As regards the latter, 
the cooperation mandates instituted by EU financial sector laws are rather all-
encompassing; for example, according to the Short Selling Regulation: “The 
competent authorities shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this 
Regulation…The competent authorities shall provide, without delay, ESMA with all 
the information necessary to carry out its duties”.237 As a result, the ESAs may enjoy 
substantial discretion in the actual determination of the extent and scope of the 
supervisory cooperation duties of CSAs towards them. 
The application of article 17 of the ESAs Regulations to supervisory cooperation 
disputes between an ESA and a CSA would raise the question of the ability of the 
former to exercise independent judgment because, in those instances, an ESA would 
be acting, both as one of the parties to the dispute and as a judge. This would pose 
some legitimacy concerns, especially in light of the extensive powers conferred on the 
ESAs throughout the various stages of the procedure of article 17. In this respect, an 
ESA has full control of the first stage of the procedure, as it has the power to initiate 
an investigation on its own initiative and also to issue a recommendation.238 In 
addition, in the second stage, the Commission’s opinion “Shall take into account the 
Authority’s recommendation”.239 Furthermore, in the third stage, an ESA is vested 
with binding powers to put an end to a breach of EU law through an individual 
decision.240 
Despite the prima facie extensive reach of the powers of the ESAs under article 17, 
these are also subject to important limitations. In the first place, the scope of an ESA’s 
direct binding decision for breaches of EU law is restricted to instances in which lack 
of compliance of a CSA with the Commission’s formal opinion also results in and/or 
implies lack of compliance of a market participant with EU law241 –which, as has 
been explained in relation to the mediation procedure in section 6.1, may not always 
be the case in instances of supervisory dissent. Additionally, the power of an ESA to 
issue a direct binding decision under article 17 is subject to strict conditionality –e.g. 
actual or potential distortion to competition or the functioning or integrity of the 
financial system, and direct applicability of the relevant EU law to the financial 
                                                
234 Art. 17.1 ESAs Regulations. 
235 Art. 17.1 ESAs Regulations.  
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institution to which the binding decision is addressed.242 These conditions largely 
restrict the use of article 17 to supervisory cooperation disputes between an ESA and 
a CSA. Furthermore, a decision of an ESA based on article 17 may be challenged by a 
CSA before the Board of Appeal of the ESAs243 and, ultimately, before CJEU;244 
consequently, this reduces the potential of an ESA’s prejudiced use of article 17. 
 
 
VII. THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE DUTY TO COOPERATE AND THE ABILITY 
TO COOPERATE: MULTI-LEVEL SUPERVISORY POWERS, LEGAL MANDATES 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
As has been explained throughout the previous sections, the constitutional, legal and 
regulatory frameworks at both the EU and Member State levels institute, in different 
degrees, cooperation duties between CSAs. Compliance with those cooperation duties 
requires an adequate empowerment of the supervisory authorities, which, for instance, 
enables them to fulfill a given request of cooperation from a counterpart. When and if 
a CSA does not have adequate powers to cooperate, the effective provision of 
cooperation may be hindered. The fragmented nature of the European supervisory 
framework, where supervisory powers are widespread among several CSAs operating 
at different levels, propitiates some tensions between cooperation duties, on the one 
side, and the ability of CSAs to provide cooperation, on the other. Such tensions owe 
to two primary reasons. 
In the first place, CSAs across the EU diverge substantially in their structure and 
powers. Over the years, each Member State has developed its own financial 
supervision architecture according to local preferences, experiences and needs.245 This 
has resulted in a somehow byzantine scheme that combines, not only various financial 
supervisory models –such as the three-pillar, the single supervisor246 or the twin-
peaks–, but also distinctive and, often, dissimilar domestic approaches to the CSAs’ 
supervisory powers. Moreover, Member States frequently shift from one model to 
another, notably as a result of crises or scandals in the financial realm and to 
consequential concerns about the effectiveness of the institutional frameworks of 
financial supervision in place;247 this has resulted in a complex and heterogeneous 
supervisory picture. Although the global financial crisis has brought about certain 
degrees of institutional convergence –e.g. towards the twin peaks model– 248there still 
are major divergences in the structure and powers of CSAs of the various Member 
States.249 
Secondly, financial supervision involves the carrying out of actions subject to 
substantive and procedural requirements of various areas of the law –such as general 
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administrative law and data protection rules– whose content also varies significantly 
across the Member States. 
The diversity of supervisory architectures and powers, as well as the differences in 
the general legal frameworks relevant to the provision of supervisory cooperation may 
create some practical problems; notably, when a CSA from a Member State requests 
the performance of a supervisory action to a CSA from another Member State, the 
latter may not be able to perform it owing to lack of powers, or because such 
provision of cooperation would result in a breach of its domestic laws. 
The Lamfalussy reports acknowledged the diversity of supervisory competencies 
of CSAs across the EU and the potential negative impact that such unevenness might 
have on supervisory cooperation, 250  highlighting the need for convergence of 
supervisory powers available to CSAs.251  These calls for greater convergence were 
indeed reflected in various FSAP directives, such as the MiFID and the MAD, which 
introduced regimes concerning the minimum supervisory powers of CSAs. For 
example, article 12 of the MAD and article 50.2 of the MiFID developed a rather 
comprehensive ad minimis catalogue of powers that CSAs must have at their disposal 
for the exercise of supervisory functions; these included, among others, accessing any 
document and data,252 requiring or demanding information from any person,253 and 
carrying out on-site inspections.254 The specific scope of those minimum supervisory 
powers was, nonetheless, conditional to the content of national laws. 255 If and when 
domestic laws did not empower a CSA to directly exercise a given supervisory 
competence included within the catalogue of minimum supervisory powers set by the 
relevant EU financial laws,256 the latter embraced the possibility of and required either 
the co-exercise of such powers with other authorities, their delegation to other 
authorities or entities, or their exercise by application to judicial authorities.257 In 
other words, according to the regulatory model encompassed by EU financial law, for 
each supervisory power listed among the minimum powers there ought to be an 
authority able to either exercise or co-exercise it in every Member State. Whereas this 
system brought about increasing consistency to the EU supervisory system, it also had 
some flaws, notably, because rather than a convergence of CSAs’ supervisory powers, 
it encouraged a minimum harmonization of powers available at the Member State 
level for supervisory tasks. Under this system, tasks instrumental for the exercise of 
supervision may be decentralized among various authorities, not necessarily limited to 
CSAs. These chains of authorities in supervision pose the risk of an increasing 
complexity of the supervisory architecture258 and, also, of supervisory cooperation 
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because, under them, the accomplishment of a single supervisory action –such as the 
gathering of information from a market participant– may require coordinated action 
by or authorizations from different authorities and/or entities in one Member State. 
The risks of an inefficient supervisory cooperation may be exacerbated when 
authorities –such as the judiciary– in charge of some tasks within a supervisory chain 
lack independence or efficiency.  
The de Larosiére Report voiced concerns about the persistence of important 
differences in the powers of CSAs and recommended the adoption of measures aimed 
at enhancing the consistency of CSAs’ supervisory remits across the EU.259 In its 
Communication on Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services 
sector,260 the Commission acknowledged that the differences among legal systems of 
the Member States was one of the reasons behind the divergences in the sanctioning 
powers of CSAs and undertook to make proposals aimed at furthering greater 
convergence in this field. 261  Post-crisis EU legislation has attempted to foster 
convergence, primarily through a broadening and/or redefinition of the catalogue of 
powers of CSAs. For example, as regards supervision concerning market abuse, the 
MAR has added the power “to enter the premises of natural and legal persons in order 
to seize documents and data…”262 to the list of minimum powers of CSAs –this being 
an area where some CSAs lacked competences.263 
Despite these improvements in the consistency of the substantive scope of the 
CSAs’ supervisory powers, the post-crisis EU financial laws are largely inspired by 
the regime of minimum harmonization of supervisory powers subject to national 
implementation, as developed by the FSAP directives264 and, consequently, they 
reflect one of the weaknesses of the pre-crisis regime, namely, the risk of supervisory 
powers being exercised through chains of actors; this may increase the complexity 
and hinder the efficiency of supervisory cooperation. 
An aspect relating to the CSAs’ ability to cooperate to which the post-de Larosiére 
overhaul has given particular attention is their mandates. The creation of the ESFS 
and the Banking Union and the allocation of important tasks to CSAs within them 
have, indeed, led to the configuration of transnational mandates that bind CSAs to the 
accomplishment of targets beyond their own jurisdictions. For instance, in their role 
as members of the governing bodies of the ESAs, the SSM and the SRM, 
representatives of CSAs must act in the interest of the Union as a whole.265 Some 
post-crisis EU laws also embrace general transnational mandates that CSAs must 
abide with in their day-to-day supervision at the national level. For example, article 7 
of the Directive 2013/36/EU –Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)– 
stipulates that: “The competent authorities in each Member State shall, in the exercise 
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of their general duties, duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the 
stability of the financial system in the other Member States concerned and, in 
particular, in emergency situations, based on the information available at the relevant 
time.”  
Despite the post-crisis broadening of the Member State CSAs’ mandates, the latter 
remain, to a primary extent, national and relate to the accomplishment of objectives 
pertaining to financial systems, markets, institutions and firms in the CSAs’ own 
jurisdictions. The laws instituting national CSAs often acknowledge, in an explicit 
manner, the national character of the CSAs’ mandates. For example, as regards the 
Financial Conduct Authority in the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA 2000) defines the FCA’s integrity objective as: “protecting and enhancing the 
integrity of the UK financial system”.266 
There is some tension between the national character of the Member State CSAs’ 
core mandates and the latter’s position within EU structures –such as the ESFS and 
the SSM– aimed at the pursuing of goals with a cross-border dimension.267 When it 
comes to the specific area of cooperation, a potential problem is that a CSA from a 
Member State may be faced with a request of cooperation whose compliance with 
would contribute to EU-wide objectives and/or mandates of financial supervision but 
might, at the same time, hinder the accomplishment of national supervisory mandates. 
Whereas the principle of supremacy of EU law would determine that a national 
mandate conflicting with a duty of cooperation set by EU law ought to be set aside,268 
in those instances, a CSA may nonetheless be subject to incentives to refuse 
cooperation or provide an incomplete cooperation, so as to maximize its compliance 
with the mandates established by domestic laws. 
The accountability relationships within which CSAs operate are critical to 
understand the way in which they may balance the mandates, duties and interests at 
stake in particular cooperation contexts. Although the post-crisis EU overhaul 
incorporates some forms of multi-level transnational accountability –e.g. an ESA may 
hold a CSA to account through the binding mediation mechanism of article 19 of the 
ESAs Regulations– the account principals with the power to call and/or hold CSAs to 
account are, to a great extent, domestic actors. For example, the appointment and 
dismissal of heads of CSAs is carried out by national governments and/or parliaments 
in each Member State. Likewise, the creation and abolition of CSAs and the budgets 
at their disposal depend on decisions adopted by political institutions in the 
jurisdictions of the CSAs concerned. In addition, the accountability of CSAs at the 
national level is essentially determined by the extent to which they accomplish their 
mandates,269 which, as referred above, tend to have a marked national character. 
Owing to the pre-eminently domestic nature of both the mandates and accountability 
of the Member State CSAs, when the latter are faced with cooperation requests in 
which national interests are at stake, they may have an incentive to give priority to the 
maximization of such interests, rather than broader targets embraced by EU law 
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cooperation duties and/or mandates. 270 This may be particularly the case in instances 
where CSAs are not properly insulated from undue political and stakeholder 
interferences in their own Member States. 
 
 
VIII. THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CRISIS, BREXIT AND THE FUTURE OF 
SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN THE EU 
 
From the outset, the EU single market for financial services has developed through a 
process of incremental integration. The Single European Act, the FSAP, the 
Lamfalussy and de Larosiére architectures, the Banking Union and the Capital 
Markets Union271 represent steps of such a process, which has led to increasing 
degrees of regulatory and supervisory convergence as well as greater centralization of 
decision-making tasks at the EU level.272 The various crises that the EU has been 
facing since the year 2008 do, nevertheless, raise some concerns about the future, 
scope and pace of the process of EU financial services integration. 
On the one side, the financial, euro and sovereign debt crises, and their effects on 
the EU economy, have hindered the trust of citizens in the EU273 and led to a decline 
of support of the process of EU integration.274 Likewise, disagreements between 
Member States on how to deal with these crises –e.g. proponents of austerity and 
structural reforms, such as Germany, vs. opponents to them, such as Greece– led to 
greater polarization and tensions within the EU.275 In addition, the post-crisis trend of 
centralization of financial regulatory, supervisory, and, more generally, executive 
powers at the EU level276 has not been equally welcomed by all the Member States.277 
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On the other side, the EU’s legitimacy and political crises have been magnified by 
the diverging approaches of the Member States in core areas of EU policy, such as 
migration and security, which have accentuated internal frictions within the EU.278 
One of the manifestations of the EU’s various crises has consisted of a rise of 
popularity of political parties that oppose EU integration –notably in France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Germany–279 and, more dramatically, the decision of the UK to 
leave the EU;280 in addition, at the EU level, the Commission and the Council have 
been mulling over a multi-speed EU with different degrees and/or speeds of 
integration.281 
 
A. The EU-UK supervisory relationship after Brexit 
 
Brexit raises important questions as regards the future of financial integration and 
supervisory cooperation in Europe. The UK is one of the main international financial 
centres and it hosts some of the largest financial entities from the EU internal 
market.282 The PRA and the FCA –as well as their predecessors– have played a 
central role in the shaping of EU financial regulation and supervision.283 Brexit will 
result in a transformation of the nature of the relationships between the CSAs from 
the EU and those of the UK. The position of the UK in this new framework will 
largely depend on whether the negotiations between the EU and the UK result in a 
soft or a hard Brexit. 
In a soft Brexit scenario, the UK would keep its membership in the European 
Economic Association (EEA)284 and, consequently, companies established in the UK 
would be able to maintain access to the single market for financial services through 
the Single Passport.285 Under this framework, the UK would be subject to EU 
                                                                                                                                      
515, 525; see also, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union [2014] ECR I-0 –where the UK challenged, 
unsuccessfully, the constitutionality of the powers of ESMA in respect of short-selling bans– as well as 
Case T-496/11, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Central Bank 
(ECB) [2015] –in which the CJEU upheld the UK’s view that the ECB lacked the power to impose 
requirements regarding the location of CCPs. Likewise, the German Federal Financial Supervision 
Authority (BaFin) also voiced concerns against the centralization of supervisory powers in the SSM –
see D. Lombardi and M. Moschella, ‘Domestic preferences and European banking supervision: 
Germany, Italy and the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2016) 39 West European Politics 462, 473. 
278 See e.g. G. Baczynska, ‘No compromise in sight, EU ministers at odds over immigration’, Reuters, 
18 Nov. 2016; and F. Murphy and I. Binnie, ‘Austria says to control migrants on Italy border, Rome 
protests’, Reuters, 4 July 2017. 
279 See B. Dodman, ‘France, Germany and the Netherlands: The elections that could derail the EU in 
2017’, France 24, 31 Dec. 2016. 
280 The majority of the votes in the EU referendum of 23 June 2016 supported Brexit –an analysis of 
the results of the EU referendum is provided by: E. Uberoi, ‘European Union Referendum 2016’, 
House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP 7639 (2016). 
281 This will be further explained in section 8.2 below. 
282 See e.g. City of London Corporation, London: Europe and the world’s financial centre (2014); and 
S. Djankov, ‘The City of London after Brexit’, LSE Discussion Paper No. 762 (2017) 5-10. 
283 See e.g. City of London Corporation, Shaping legislation: UK engagement in EU financial services 
policy-making (2016). 
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financial markets legislation286 and, therefore, to the corresponding cooperation duties 
vis-à-vis other CSAs and the ESAs. As regards the position of the UK within the 
ESFS, the representatives of the PRA and the FCA would become non-voting 
members of the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs.287 When it comes to supervisory 
cooperation disputes, the UK CSAs would be subject to the mediation mechanism of 
article 19 of the ESAs Regulations; however, the adoption of a binding mediation 
decision addressed to them would correspond to the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) Surveillance Authority, not to the ESAs.288 The likelihood of membership of 
the UK in the EEA post-Brexit is, in principle, low289 because it would imply a series 
of commitments, such as acceptance of the EU four freedoms and indirect judicial 
oversight by the CJEU,290 which clash with the UK Conservative Party’s manifesto.291  
As regards the possibility of UK financial entities relocating to the EU in order to 
maintain access to the single market, an Opinion issued by ESMA in May 2017292 
suggests that authorizations to relocating entities will be subject to strict 
conditionality293and CSAs of the Member States will be expected to monitor the real 
reasons for moving to the EU and to “…reject any relocation request creating letter-
box entities where, for instance, extensive use of outsourcing and delegation is 
foreseen with the intention of benefitting from an EU passport, while essentially 
performing all substantial activities or functions outside the EU27.”294 
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In a hard Brexit scenario,295 namely one in which the UK does not maintain 
membership in the EEA and there is no alternative agreement giving it similar rights 
as those sourcing from EEA membership,296 the UK would become a third country for 
regulatory and supervisory purposes.297 In such a scenario, the UK’s access to the 
single market for financial services would depend on the adoption of equivalence 
decisions298 whereby the Commission might decide that the UK’s financial regulatory 
and supervisory regime is equivalent to the EU regime. 299  The access rights 
encompassed by the equivalence framework are, however, much more restricted than 
those sourcing from the single passport;300 for instance, equivalence can only be 
requested by third countries and granted by the Commission when an EU financial 
law embraces such possibility, and only for the specific purposes stipulated in such 
law; moreover, a decision on equivalence can be unilaterally withdrawn by the 
Commission.301 As regards financial supervision, the UK’s CSAs would not anymore 
be subject to supervisory cooperation duties set in EU law; nor would they form part 
of the ESFS and its supervisory cooperation instruments. More generally, Brexit –
particularly, in its hard version– will bring greater legal divergence between the EU 
and the UK,302 and this may have a potential impact on the ability of CSAs from both 
sides of the channel to cooperate with each other.  
In areas of systemic importance for the financial system, Brexit may require a 
redefinition of supervisory relationships between the EU and the UK, to address 
potential threats to the stability of the EU financial system. One of such areas is post-
trading.303 In June 2017, the Commission proposed a new regulatory framework304 
concerning third country Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (CCPs),305 which is 
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aimed at strengthening their supervision with a view to mitigating systemic risks in 
the EU.306 Owing to the central role that CCPs play in the functioning of financial 
systems, their failure may have a systemic impact.307 Recognized third country CCPs 
provide clearing of a significant amount of financial instruments denominated in Euro 
and other currencies of the Member States;308 as a result, disruptions affecting 
recognized third country CCPs may have a major effect in the stability of the EU 
financial system.309 In the view of the Commission, the supervisory cooperation 
arrangements embraced by the equivalence regime did not properly guarantee a robust 
supervision of recognized non-EU CCPs: “…after a third-country CCP has been 
recognised, ESMA has encountered difficulties in accessing information from the 
CCP, in conducting on-site inspections of the CCP and in sharing information with 
the relevant EU regulators, supervisors and central banks. As a result, there is a risk 
that third country CCP practices and/or adjustments to risk management models go 
undetected and/or unaddressed, which may have important financial-stability 
implications for the EU entities.”310 
The Commission’s Proposal specifically acknowledged the risks posed by Brexit; 
the UK hosts some of the main CCPs clearing euro-denominated transactions, such as 
London Clearing House Limited (LCH);311 consequently, after the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU, there would be a major increase in the volume of such transactions 
being cleared in third countries, and subject to lesser degrees of EU oversight.312 
Under the proposed reform, ESMA is tasked with carrying out assessments about 
the systemic importance of third country CCPs for the financial stability of the EU.313 
Those assessments may determine, either that a CCP is, or is likely to become, 
systemically important (Tier 2 CCPs),314 or that a CCP is neither systemically 
important nor likely to become so (Tier-1 CCPs).315 Tier-1 CCPs are subject to the 
general equivalence and recognition regime.316 Tier-2 CCPs can be divided in two 
categories, which receive different regulatory treatment. On the one side, ESMA may 
consider that a Tier-2 CCP is systemically important; this category of CCPs is under a 
special regime whereby, in addition to compliance with the general equivalence 
conditions, they must fulfill additional requirements, such as the EMIR’s prudential 
rules applicable to CCPs in the EU.317 On the other side, ESMA may conclude that a 
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CCP is of substantial systemic importance;318 this would apply to CCPs that, because 
of their particular features –e.g. their concentration of clearing operations– pose major 
risks to the stability of the EU or to one or more Member States;319 the Commission’s 
Proposal considers that the regulatory and supervisory arrangements embraced by the 
third-country equivalence-recognition regime are not suitable for this type of CCPs 
and that, therefore, they should not have access to it;320 ESMA may propose to the 
Commission that a CCP deemed as being of substantial systemic importance is not 
recognized; if the Commission adopts an implementing act to that effect, then the 
recognition regime would be dis-applied, with the result that the third-country Tier 2 
CCP concerned could only provide services within the EU single market by relocating 
to the EU.321 The criteria that ESMA will use to determine the systemic entity of 
CCPs include their size, the value in each EU currency of the transactions cleared by 
them, as well as the impact that their failure would have on the EU financial 
system.322 Consequently, the proposed regime might result in some UK-based CCPs 
that play a central role in the clearing of Euro-denominated transactions, such as 
LCH, being required to move their clearing business to the EU or, otherwise, losing 
their access to the EU single market.323 
Overall, the proposed reform would result in greater centralization of supervisory 
functions pertaining to third-country CCPs at the EU level. Notably, ESMA would be 
entrusted with the supervision of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 CCPs, particularly with 
respect to ongoing compliance with the conditions for recognition.324 In addition, 
some of the EMIR’s proposed amendments are aimed at fostering supervisory 
cooperation, for example, by requiring that: “the cooperation arrangements between 
ESMA and the relevant competent authorities of equivalent CCP third-country 
regimes must be effective in practice”.325 The Commission’s Proposal also stipulates 
that equivalence and recognition will be conditional on the effective cooperation by 
CSAs from third countries; if the latter fail to cooperate in good faith with ESMA 
and/or other EU supervisors, the Commission may decide to revoke an equivalence 
decision.326 The Commission’s Proposal has been complemented by the ECB’s 
Governing Council Recommendation of 22 June 2017 to amend article 22 of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank.327 Under the proposed reform, CCPs would be put under the ECB’s regulatory 
and supervisory remit.328 The ECB’s proposal largely builds on the CJEU’s decision 
in Case T-496/11, relating to the UK’s challenge of the power of the ECB to regulate 
CCPs –and, notably, of its competence to impose location requirements– under the 
Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework; the CJEU upheld the UK’s views, but 
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acknowledged, at the same time, that the ECB could request the EU legislator to be 
granted the power to regulate CCPs –if the ECB deemed such power necessary for the 
proper performance of its tasks.329 The proposed amendment of article 22 of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks would result in additional 
centralization of CCP clearing regulation and supervision at the EU level, with the 
ECB playing a central role in the oversight, not only of EU CCPs, but also of third-
country CCPs that clear euro-denominated transactions.330 The ECB has indicated that 
it will favor a strict approach with regard to the recognition of third-country CCPs, in 
order to preserve financial stability in the EU.331 Consequently, the formulation of this 
proposal in the midst of the Brexit talks has raised concerns among UK policy makers 
and financial industry actors, which foresee a potential threat to a key sector of the 
UK’s financial industry.332 
In the post-Brexit scenario, the incentives of CSAs from the EU and the UK to 
cooperate with each other will largely be determined by the degrees of financial 
interdependence between the EU and the UK. A first potential scenario is one where 
the UK would lose relevance as a financial center in Europe; this may happen, for 
instance, if there is an increase in financial outflows from the UK to the EU, in 
combination with a decrease in financial inflows from the EU to the UK;333 in such a 
case, the scope of cooperation between the EU and the UK would be more limited. A 
second potential scenario is one where the UK would retain its relevance as a 
financial center in Europe, and in which the high degrees of financial interdependence 
between the EU and the UK are maintained;334 in such a second scenario, CSAs 
would have incentives to develop arrangements that guarantee an efficient 
supervisory cooperation, even in absence of a strong framework of binding 
cooperation duties. 
 
 
B. The prospects of a multi-speed EU and its impact on supervisory cooperation 
 
The EU political crisis, which was, to a certain degree, exacerbated by the Brexit 
vote, 335 received mixed policy reactions. Whereas some proposals point in the 
direction of greater integration and centralization of financial supervision at the EU 
level, others might lead to the coexistence of mixed degrees of integration within the 
single market for financial services.  
On the one side, the EU economic and political crises have increased awareness 
within the EU-27 about the need to advance the process of capital markets integration 
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in order to support the EU economy.336 The Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets 
Union Action Plan, published by the Commission on 8 June 2017, acknowledges the 
instrumental role that supervision plays in the good functioning of capital markets and 
suggests the need to move towards greater integration of the EU financial supervisory 
framework.337 The reforms put forward by the Mid-Term Review document include a 
future revision of the powers of the ESAs, and particularly, ESMA, with a view to 
fostering their role in EU financial supervision, as well as broadening the areas of the 
financial system within their direct supervisory remit.338 These reforms, which would 
lead to more centralization of financial supervision in the EU, build on the plan for a 
Financial Union339  proposed by the Five President’s Report, published in June 
2015.340 The pillars of the Financial Union project are the Banking Union as well as 
the Capital Markets Union341 –as regards the latter, the Five President’s Report 
envisaged the future creation of a Single European Capital Markets Supervisor.342 
On the other side, the idea of a multi-speed Europe, which has been gaining force 
since the Rome Summit of March 2017,343 raises some questions as regards the future 
of financial integration and supervisory cooperation in the EU. In the White Paper on 
the Future of Europe, published on 1 March 2017,344 the Commission presented five 
potential scenarios regarding the EU’s future; these scenarios, which ranged from 
“less EU” to “more EU”,345 reflected different political views about the process of EU 
integration. One of the pathways suggested by the Commission was one where “The 
European Union allows willing Member States to do more together in specific 
areas;”346 this idea, which received mixed degrees of support among the Member 
States,347 was embraced by the leaders of the EU-27, the Council, the Parliament and 
the Commission in the Rome declaration of 25 March 2017.348 There is some 
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uncertainty as regards whether and the extent to which the single market for financial 
services would be included within the scope of a multi-speed Union; the White Paper 
on the Future of Europe does not refer to the financial sector among the areas that 
would operate under multi-tier arrangements.349 In addition, after the Rome Summit, 
EU policy makers have taken a series of decisions –such as the above-referred 
proposals to strengthen ESMA’s powers in the field of post-trading– that encompass 
an underlying notion of single-speed EU and of advancing en bloc in the process of 
integration of the financial supervisory framework.  
There are policy arguments that justify a same-speed approach to financial 
regulation and supervision. Notably, the creation of different speeds and/or tiers of 
financial integration in the EU could hinder the process of development and 
consolidation of the single market for financial services. As regards financial 
supervision, the coexistence of various levels of supervisory integration –e.g. with 
asymmetries in the extent and scope of cooperation duties depending on the Member 
States concerned– could result in distortions in the quality and consistency of the 
EU’s financial supervision. Indeed, a multi-speed internal market for financial 
services would be contrary to the objective of “ensuring common implementation of 
the rules for the financial sector and more centralised supervisory enforcement”350 
and, more generally, to the process of construction of a Financial Union.  
 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The post-financial crisis regulatory overhaul has transformed supervisory 
relationships in the EU dramatically. The new system is based on a greater 
centralization of powers at the EU level, with EU bodies and institutions, such as the 
ESAs and the ECB, playing a key role in both the exercise and coordination of 
financial supervision. The EU financial supervision architecture remains, nonetheless, 
largely decentralized and the CSAs of the Member States –each with their own, and 
often dissimilar, structures, mandates and powers– carry out important day-to-day 
supervision of their own financial markets, actors and institutions. One of the 
challenges brought about by this new complex multilevel architecture is how to 
articulate an efficient coordination, interaction and cooperation between the actors 
entrusted with supervisory responsibilities in its various levels. The response of EU 
law has been threefold.  
In the first place, there has been a process of increasing harmonization of the rules 
on supervisory cooperation. EU directives and regulations in the financial field have 
developed a rather comprehensive catalogue of cooperation duties, reducing the 
discretion of Member States in the interpretation of the nature and scope of 
supervisory cooperation obligations. 
Secondly, the mechanisms for solving supervisory cooperation disputes among 
CSAs have been improved and strengthened. Notably, the allocation of binding 
mediation powers to the ESAs vis-à-vis CSAs, albeit subject to important limitations, 
constitutes an important change of paradigm compared to the soft-law nature of the 
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Lamfalussy Committees’ mediation decisions. The threat of deployment of those 
powers may create incentives for CSAs to comply with their cooperation duties, so as 
to avoid the potential costs of an ESA’s binding intervention in a supervisory 
cooperation dispute. 
Thirdly, post-crisis EU laws have broadened the catalogue of minimum 
supervisory powers at the disposal of CSAs of the Member States, hence increasing 
their ability to fulfill requests of cooperation from fellow CSAs. Likewise, the ESFS 
and the Banking Union have embraced a transnationalization of supervisory mandates 
whereby Member State CSAs are bound to the accomplishment, not only of national 
objectives, but also of EU-wide supervisory targets. 
Despite the advancement of EU financial services integration and supervisory 
convergence that the post-crisis regulatory overhaul, the ESFS and the Banking Union 
have brought, this paper has identified and analyzed important obstacles for an 
efficient supervisory cooperation in the EU. 
First, EU financial laws still encompass exceptions to the duty to cooperate that 
may be subject to biased interpretations and opportunistic uses by CSAs, in order to 
refuse cooperation in particular instances. More generally, the analysis has shown that 
the content and scope of supervisory cooperation duties –as defined by EU laws– 
often lack clarity and precision; this carries the risk of diverging interpretations by 
CSAs across the EU and, consequently, of supervisory dissent. 
Secondly, within the ESFS, the use of instruments for the settlement of 
disagreements between CSAs is subject to strict conditions that limit, considerably, 
their applicability in cases of supervisory cooperation disputes. Moreover, the 
activation of the ESAs’ mediation mechanism may create tensions and hinder trust 
between CSAs and, consequently, affect their future cooperation. As regards disputes 
between an ESA and a CSA, the ESFS implicitly vests resolution power in the ESAs, 
hence giving rise to potential conflicts of interest.  
Thirdly, notwithstanding the increasing degrees of harmonization of supervisory 
powers across the EU, there still are important differences in the competences of 
CSAs in various Member States; this may, in turn, affect their ability to fulfill 
cooperation requests. Likewise, whereas the ESFS and the Banking Union have 
instituted transnational supervisory mandates, CSAs from the Member States operate 
under accountability structures that are, primarily, domestic; this may incentivize 
CSAs to pursue the prioritization of national interests in detriment of the 
accomplishment of EU-wide targets. 
Fourthly, the EU political crisis, Brexit –which may result in the UK becoming a 
third country for supervisory purposes–, and the prospects of a multi-speed EU with 
various degrees of integration, raise some concerns about the future of the process of 
EU financial integration and of supervisory cooperation within the single market for 
financial services. 
In spite of these various crisis fronts, and of the limitations of the current EU legal 
and regulatory frameworks in dealing with the complexity of the financial supervision 
architecture, capital markets is, nonetheless, an area where the process of integration 
has been advancing steadily. Brexit has, indeed, reinforced the determination of EU 
policy-makers to furthering such process; as put by Commissioner Dombrovskis: “As 
we face the departure of the largest EU financial centre, we are committed to stepping 
up our efforts to further strengthen and integrate the EU capital markets.” 351 
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Moreover, the EU institutions consider the enhancement of supervisory cooperation 
and convergence within the EU as a key priority in the process of future financial 
reforms. For example, one of the main elements of the Commission’s public 
consultation on the operations of the ESAs, related to the effectiveness of their tools 
and powers in fostering supervisory convergence and cooperation across borders.352 
Also, the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan has 
highlighted the need to strengthen the powers of ESMA to guarantee the consistency 
of financial supervision across the EU.353 Overall, these reforms may contribute to 
enhance the quality and efficiency of supervisory cooperation in the EU; on the one 
side, by removing legal and regulatory barriers to cooperation, they may increase the 
ability of CSAs to cooperate with each other; on the other side, by supporting greater 
financial integration, these reforms may help to align the interests of CSAs and, 
consequently, their incentives to provide meaningful cooperation.  
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